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Abstract
In the last two decades advances in the theory of labour market fluctuations have empha-
sised the role of new hires’ wage rigidity—rather than wage rigidity of existing workers—to
explain the large volatility of unemployment observed in the data. However, recent evi-
dence suggests that wages paid to newly hired workers are substantially pro-cyclical. By
considering the effect that wage changes can have on workers’ effort, and therefore on out-
put, this paper provides two novel theoretical results. First, it is shown that the anticipation
by firms of the effort response of new hires to wage changes can amplify the magnitude of
shocks to the extent that, in contrast with the existing literature, the cyclicality of the hiring
wage becomes irrelevant for their decision to hire new workers, and hence for the volatility
of job creation. Second, it is shown that firms’ expectation of existing workers’ downward
wage rigidity—and the anticipation of their negative reciprocity response to future wage
cuts—does matter for the expected value of posting a new vacancy, and under certain con-
ditions it may even reduce firms’ incentive to hire.
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1 Introduction
Workers’ and firms’ attitudes toward wage setting and the employment relationship have fun-
damental implications for the cyclical behaviour of the labour market. Grounded in the job
flows approach and following the seminal work of Shimer (2005), advances in the theory of
labour market fluctuations have placed particular emphasis on the role of rigidities in the wage
determination of newly hired workers to explain the observed volatility of vacancies and unem-
ployment. This literature has also shifted away from the view that downward wage rigidity
in existing jobs may be an important driver of large and persistent unemployment fluctuations.
Although present, this latter rigidity is irrelevant for the volatility of job creation in existing
models (Pissarides, 2009), and it appears unlikely to be the main driver of the extraordinarily
long duration of unemployment (Elsby, Shin, and Solon, 2016).
However, more recent evidence has shown that wage offers made to newly hired workers
are substantially pro-cyclical (e.g. Haefke, Sonntag, and Rens (2013));1 and that the existing
theoretical framework cannot simultaneously accommodate the empirical volatilities of both
the relevant hiring wage and the vacancy-unemployment ratio (Kudlyak, 2014). Hence, al-
though the literature on the subject is particularly developed, it is not yet clear whether the
emphasis on new hires’ wage cyclicality is well placed, or what impact the wage rigidity of
incumbent workers has on the cyclical volatility of job creation.2
This paper contributes to this literature by considering the effects that the anticipation by
firms’ of their workers’ effort responses to wage changes can have on the amplitude and cycli-
cal behaviour of wages and unemployment. In so doing, the paper provides two novel theo-
retical results. First, in contrast to the existing literature, by appealing to the reciprocity effects
induced by wage changes on firms’ output, the analysis demonstrates that the cyclicality of
the hiring wage is irrelevant for the volatility of the vacancy-unemployment ratio. Second,
once uncertainty around the evolution of job-match productivity is introduced, it is shown
that the expected downward rigidity in the wage of incumbent workers does matter for the
present value of new employment relationships; and the conditions under which this expecta-
tion increases the volatility of job creation and unemployment are derived and discussed.
The main behavioural mechanism underling both these key results is the presence of a pos-
1See also the recent evidence from Martins, Solon, and Thomas (2012), Carneiro, Guimarães, and Portugal
(2012), Stüber (2017) and Schaefer and Singleton (2017).
2Surveys of the existing literature can be found in Mortensen and Nagypál (2007), Rogerson and Shimer (2011),
Elsby, Michaels, and Ratner (2015) and Ljungqvist and Sargent (2017).
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itive wage-effort relationship, which stems from the optimal effort response of workers to their
matched firm’s wage setting policy. Whenever the labour market is hit by an exogenous shock
and firms anticipate having to adjust their wages, consideration of this relationship enables
one to characterise the effect of wage changes on employed workers’ effort, which in turn af-
fects output and amplifies the magnitude of the shock. To gain a preliminary intuition of this
mechanism, consider the steady-state value of a new match to a firm as given by
J =
y(p, e)− w
1− δ(1− ρ) ,
which typically determines a firm’s vacancy posting decision. Here output y is an increasing
function of a productivity shock p and of the employed worker’s effort e, which, in accordance
to the efficiency wage tradition (e.g. Akerlof (1982), Akerlof and Yellen (1990)) and the litera-
ture on reciprocity in labour markets (e.g. Bewley (2007), Fehr, Goette, and Zehnder (2009)),
can be written as an increasing function of the wage e = e(w); (δ is the firm’s discount factor
and ρ an exogenous job destruction rate). For now it is sufficient to suppose that, as a result
of optimal wage setting/bargaining, the wage is increasing in p. Next, consider a productivity
shock, and let εwp denote the elasticity of wages with respect to productivity. The steady-state
elasticity of the value of a new job match with respect to p can therefore be written as
y(p, e(w)) +
[
ye(p, e)e′(w) ·εwp w
]−εwp w
y(p, e)− w . (1)
The bigger the size of this expression, the larger the effect of the productivity shock on the
firm’s value of the new match, and hence, the greater the volatility of job creation and unem-
ployment.
In a large body of the existing literature on unemployment volatility the effect of wage
changes on effort is not considered: e′(w) = 0 and firms’ output corresponds to p, implying
that the expression above collapses to
p−εwp w
p−w (see e.g. Pissarides (2009)). In such a case, the size
of (1) crucially depends on the elasticity of the hiring wage εwp , and on the difference between
the output and the wage, i.e. what is referred to in the literature as the profit margin (Elsby et al.,
2015) or the fundamental surplus (Ljungqvist and Sargent, 2017). This simple discussion reflects
the insights of Shimer (2005), Hall (2005b), and subsequent theoretical models that emphasised
the role of new hires’ wage rigidity (i.e. εwp = 0), or wage stickiness (i.e. εwp < 1), as the main
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mechanism to increase the size of (1);3 it also reflects the argument put forward by Hagedorn
and Manovskii (2008) and Pissarides (2009) among others, according to which, even if hiring
wages were entirely rigid, it is the actual size of the profit margin p− w that matters: only if
this margin is sufficiently small will slight changes in productivity generate large fluctuations
in the present value of profit, and therefore in vacancy creation.4
By considering the effect of wage changes on effort and output—captured by the term[
ye(p, e)e′(w) ·εwp w
]
> 0 in (1)—the present paper formally establishes this channel as an ad-
ditional and important amplification mechanism; and develops a theoretical framework for a
transparent analysis of its implications.5 In particular, the first contribution of this paper is
to show that if firms optimally set the wage to account for their workers’ reciprocal response,
in contrast with the existing literature concerned with new hires’ wage rigidity, the extent of
the cyclicality of the hiring wage becomes irrelevant for the volatility of vacancies and unem-
ployment. Essentially, the outcome of wage setting is such that the marginal effect of a wage
adjustment on profit is optimally balanced by the change in workers’ effort at the margin, leav-
ing room for shocks to be fully absorbed by the present value of profit from a new match.6 As
such, the theoretical framework developed here can generate outcomes that are quantitatively
consistent with plausible empirical estimates of the volatilities of both the hiring wage and the
vacancy-unemployment ratio (a simple calibration exercise is presented in Appendix A).
Recent empirical evidence on wage and unemployment adjustments in the business cy-
cle has also questioned the role of expected wage rigidity in the wage of incumbent workers
for firms’ job creation decisions (Elsby et al., 2016). In his influential paper Pissarides (2009)
3See Mortensen and Nagypál (2007) and Rogerson and Shimer (2011) for surveys. Also, to avoid confusion,
the present paper defines wage rigidity as the acyclical behaviour of wages, i.e. when wages do not adjust to
productivity shocks (downward/upward or both); and wage stickiness as the less than proportional cyclicality of
wages with respect to productivity, i.e. when the wage-productivity elasticity is less than one (Pissarides, 2009).
4See the also the discussion in Section 3.1, and Elsby et al. (2015) and Ljungqvist and Sargent (2017) for a com-
plete exposition of these points.
5The implications of a positive wage-effort relationship in a search and matching framework have also been
analysed by Wesselbaum (2013) and Kuang and Wang (2017). Wesselbaum (2013) considers the effort function
proposed by de la Croix, de Walque, and Wouters (2009) and through a calibration exercise shows that, due to
cyclical changes in effort, his model quantitatively outperforms a canonical model based on Nash bargaining.
However, this result remains sensitive to the value of several parameters that enter the specific effort function
considered. As such it is not clear, in the model of Wesselbaum (2013), to what extent the cyclicality of effort
can amplify shocks. On the other hand, Kuang and Wang (2017) show that gift-exchange considerations by firms
generate wage stickiness for new hires which, as the discussion around equation (1) highlighted, contribute to
increase unemployment volatility. In fact, as they also point out—and in contrast with the results established in
this paper—if hiring wages are instead entirely flexible, their baseline calibration fails to generate the observed
volatility of the vacancy-unemployment ratio.
6In terms of equation (1), optimal wage setting would imply that
[
ye(p, e)e′(w) ·εwp w
]
−εwp w = 0. This expres-
sion in fact corresponds to the first-order condition characterising the optimal wage in the model of this paper. As
such, in this paper, the expression for the steady-state elasticity of market tightness does not feature the elasticity
of the hiring wage.
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shows that even if the wage of incumbent workers were entirely rigid, firms will be able to
internalise these future rigidities in the equilibrium wage negotiated with their new hires at
the start of the employment relationship, leaving the volatility of job creation unaffected by
the anticipation of wage rigidities in existing jobs. This conclusion has however been recently
re-evaluated in two prominent studies: the theoretical model of Eliaz and Spiegler (2014), who
show that by generating ex-post inefficient layoffs, existing workers’ downward wage rigid-
ity reduces firms’ expected duration of new employment relationships, negatively influencing
their expected value; and the quantitative analysis of Bils, Chang, and Kim (2016), who show
that if firms can contract upon workers’ effort (i.e. the employment contract is complete), and
the wage of existing workers does not adjust to negative shocks (due to staggered Nash bar-
gaining), firms would require existing workers to be more productive, therefore lowering the
relative value of hiring a new worker and reducing job creation.
In light of these findings, the second contribution of this paper is to provide an alternative
and complementary perspective to the insights advanced by Eliaz and Spiegler (2014) and
Bils et al. (2016), by identifying another channel through which the expectation by firms of
downward rigidity in the wage of incumbent workers can affect the volatility of job creation. In
particular, even if the employment contract is incomplete (in contrast to Bils et al. (2016)), and
even if incumbent workers’ wage rigidity does not generate endogenous layoffs (in contrast to
Eliaz and Spiegler (2014)), the anticipation by firms of the relatively large cost of implementing
wage cuts in the event of a negative shock—that is, the anticipation of stronger negative effort
responses from incumbent workers—can negatively influence the expected present value of
new employment relationships, dampening hiring incentives and increasing the volatility of
job creation and unemployment.
The two novel results of this paper are formally established within a theoretical frame-
work that builds on a growing body of literature exploring the implications of fairness and
reciprocity in labour markets (Fehr et al., 2009).7 More specifically, the paper incorporates the
model of asymmetric reciprocity and wage setting developed by Dickson and Fongoni (2016)
into a canonical search and matching model à la Pissarides (1985, 2000). According to this,
wage setting is formalised as a two-stage game where firms (the first movers) make take-it-
or-leave-it wage offers to workers (the second movers). Workers evaluate wage contracts with
7This literature spans from the efficiency wage models of Akerlof (1982) and Akerlof and Yellen (1990), to more
recent applications of fairness and reciprocity in labour markets, such as, Danthine and Kurmann (2007, 2010) and
Eliaz and Spiegler (2014).
5
respect to a reference ‘fair’ wage and are heterogenous on the basis of their employment status
and reference wage. New hires arrive at firms with an exogenously-given reference wage; in-
cumbents are characterised by adaptation: their reference wage is endogenously determined
by their wage in the previous period. Employed workers’ optimal choice of effort, in light of
the wage paid by firms, yields a wage-effort relationship where loss aversion implies a kink
at the reference wage, characterising their ‘asymmetric reference-dependent reciprocity’ (Dick-
son and Fongoni, 2016). Combined with reference wage adaptation in a dynamic environment,
asymmetric reciprocity also implies that workers’ optimal effort response to wage cuts is larger
than their response to equivalent-sized wage rises, generating downward wage rigidity. An-
ticipating this, firms setting the optimal wage face an inter-temporal trade-off at the margin
between the benefit of a higher wage today, i.e. higher effort, versus the cost associated with
employing a worker with a higher reference wage in the future, due to reference wage adapta-
tion.8 As such, by considering the implications of employed workers’ asymmetric reciprocity
for optimal wage setting and job creation, this paper formally establishes that: i) pro-cyclical
hiring wages are consistent with large fluctuations in the expected surplus from new matches,
since shocks are amplified by the anticipated change in newly hired workers’ effort; and ii) the
expected (disproportionate) drop of existing workers’ effort in the event of wage cuts generates
downward wage rigidity and can reduce the expected value of new employment relationships,
therefore increasing the volatility of job creation.
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 develops the model and char-
acterises firms’ optimal wage setting policy, workers’ optimal effort choice and the steady-state
equilibrium. Section 3 studies the role of new hires’ wage and effort cyclicality for the volatil-
ity of job creation; while Section 4 introduces uncertainty and studies the effect of expected
downward wage rigidity of incumbent workers. Section 5 provides some concluding remarks.
Additional material is contained in Appendix A. All proofs are cointained in Appendix B.
8It can be useful to clarify the conceptual distinction between a worker’s reservation wage and a worker’s refer-
ence wage. The reservation wage is the wage below which a worker would optimally turn down a job offer, stay
unemployed and continue to search for jobs. The reference wage instead is a concept that captures a worker’s
perception of what is a fair wage, that is, the wage level relative to which the worker evaluates the fairness of an
employment contract. While the possibility that the two might coincide should not be ruled out, this paper con-
siders the case where they do not. In doing so the paper shows that, so long as the worker’s reservation wage is
not binding—i.e. so long as a wage offer exceeds the reservation wage—firms’ anticipation of how workers eval-
uate wage contracts relative to a reference ‘fair’ wage generates additional ‘behavioural’ constraints to their wage
setting and hiring decisions, with non-trivial consequences for vacancies and unemployment fluctuations.
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2 Model
2.1 Labour Market Environment
Consider a labour market with a continuum of infinitely lived identical firms and a continuum
of measure one of infinitely lived workers who differ with respect to their employment status.
Denote the initial period of an employment relationship by s. At the beginning of each period
t a worker can be in one of three states: unemployed and searching for a job, if t < s; employed
as a new hire, if t = s; or employed as an incumbent, if t > s and the worker is not laid off.
Workers’ preferences are reference-dependent: they evaluate wage contracts with respect
to a reference ‘fair’ wage r ∈ R ⊂ R+. It is assumed that a worker’s reference wage at the
beginning of each t depends on their employment status as follows. In the first employment
period t = s newly hired workers, denoted by i, are assumed to be heterogenous with respect
to their reference wage rit, which is exogenous. In particular,
A1. rit is the realisation of a random variable on the state spaceR = [0, r¯]with density function
γ0, cumulative distribution function Γ0, and Γ0(r¯) =
∫ r¯
0 γ0(ri)dri = 1.
On the other hand, from the second employment period onwards t > s, incumbent workers,
denoted by j, adapt their reference wage to the most recent wage contract r jt = wt−1. A such,
A2. the reference wage of employed workers {i, j} evolves according to the following adap-
tation rule:
r jt+1 = wt, rit ∼ Γ0, Γ0 given. (2)
Assumptions A1-A2 impose a crucial distinction between newly hired and incumbent work-
ers, entirely captured by their reference wage: a newly hired worker is assumed to have a non-
negative, exogenously-given reference wage, while an incumbent’s reference wage is assumed
to be determined (endogenously) by the wage they were paid in the previous employment
period.9
9This assumption (A2) is consistent with a large body of evidence documented in the labour market literature on
reference wage formation as well as by other behavioural science sub-disciplines concerned with reference point
formation. The first piece of evidence supporting this idea comes from the seminal experiment of Kahneman,
Knetsch, and Thaler (1986). (see also Kahneman and Thaler (1991) and Baucells and Sarin (2010) for a review of
the early literature on adaptation, or habituation, in social psychology). Adaptation to past wage contracts is also
supported by several anthropological studies (see the survey of Bewley (2007)). In the context of experimental
studies, indirect evidence in support of this hypothesis comes from the field experiments of Gneezy and List (2006)
and Mas (2006), and the laboratory experiments of Clark, Masclet, and Villeval (2010), Gächter and Thöni (2010)
and Koch (2016) among others. Direct evidence of reference wage adaptation has also been documented by the
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The unemployment rate is ut, the employment rate is nt and the vacancy rate is vt. The
labour force Lt is constant and fixed, and normalised to unity. The number of job matches
taking place per unit time is m¯t, where
A3. m¯ is a linearly homogeneous matching function, increasing and concave in both its argu-
ments u and v.
Let the tightness of the labour market be defined by θt = vt/ut. The probability that a vacant
job is matched with a worker is h(θt) ≡ m¯(ut, vt)/vt, h′(θt) < 0, whilst the probability of an
unemployed worker making contact with a vacancy is f (θt) ≡ m¯(ut, vt)/ut, f ′(θt) > 0. The
elasticity of the matching function with respect to unemployment is denoted by σ ∈ (0, 1).
The parameters of the model are assumed to be such that every worker-firm match is mu-
tually advantageous: all the unemployed workers that are matched with firms are hired.10 As
such, f (θt) represents the job-finding rate. On the other hand, employed workers move into
unemployment at a rate ρ ∈ (0, 1), the exogenous job-destruction rate. The evolution of mean
unemployment can therefore be expressed by the difference between the flows in and out of
unemployment:
∆ut+1 = ρ[1− ut]− f (θt)ut, u0 given. (3)
2.2 Asymmetric Reciprocity and Optimal Wage Setting
This section presents a model of reciprocity and wage setting following the microeconomic
framework developed by Dickson and Fongoni (2016). The model is also extended to an
infinite-horizon environment, facilitating the subsequent analysis in the context of a search
and matching framework.
field experiment of Chemin and Kurmann (2014) and the laboratory experiment of Sliwka and Werner (2017).
Moreover, the idea that ex-ante contracts serve as entitlements for future renegotiations was advanced by Hart
and Moore (2008) and further explored in Herweg and Schmidt (2012) in the literature of incomplete contracts.
The laboratory experiments of Fehr, Hart, and Zehnder (2011, 2014), Bartling and Schmidt (2015) and Herz and
Taubinsky (2016) provide strong support for this hypothesis.
10By this it is implicitly assumed that firms’ zero-profit condition at the time of hiring is always satisfied, and
that any wage offer is such that the value to workers of being employed is greater or equal to the value of being
unemployed, i.e. the reservation wage is not binding. The former assumption has been widely used in the liter-
ature (see for instance Pissarides (1987, 2000)), whilst the latter is a simplification which implies that unemployed
workers matched with firms will accept any wage offer (as for instance in Michaillat (2012)). The condition that
needs to be satisfied for this latter assumption to hold is spelled out in Section 2.4. Moreover, as shown in Section
A.2, Appendix A a calibration of the model reveals that, for conventional values of unemployment income, the
workers’ reservation wage is never binding. As such notice that in the context of this paper, a worker could accept
an employment contract that pays a wage they perceive to be unfair. In fact it is not inconceivable that a worker
might prefer to be employed at a wage perceived as unfair, rather than remaining unemployed. Moreover, as long
as there exists a wedge between a worker’s return from being unemployed and the value of being employed, the
results derived hereafter will hold.
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Consider a representative worker-firm employment relationship that starts in period s. In-
formation is considered to be complete. At the beginning of each employment period t ≥ s the
firm learns the match productivity p ∈ P ⊂ R+ and the worker’s reference wage r ∈ R ⊂ R+,
and subsequently decides on the profit-maximising wage contract w ∈ W ⊂ R+.
After evaluating the firm’s wage contract in relation to their reference wage, the worker
decides on the utility-maximising level of effort e ∈ E ⊂ R+ which generates output for the
firm according to the production function y : P × E → R+. Payoffs are then realised, the
form of which is described next. Therefore, in each employment period t ≥ s, wage setting is
formalised as a two-stage game of complete and perfect information in which the firm makes
take-it-or-leave-it wage offers to the worker.11 Since choices are made sequentially and the firm
is assumed to be motivated only by profit, the game can be solved by backward induction.12
2.2.1 Payoffs
In each employment period t ≥ s the instantaneous profit function of an operating firm pi :
W ×P × E → R takes the following form:13
pi(wt; pt, et) = y(pt, et)− wt,
where
F1. y is strictly increasing and linear on P × E , with yep > 0.
Assumption F1 implies a linear production function exhibiting constant returns to effort, where
the marginal product of effort is increasing in the match productivity.14
11For the relative incidence of take-it-or-leave-it wage offers and wage bargaining in employment relationships,
see the evidence presented in Hall and Krueger (2012) and Brenzel, Gartner, and Schnabel (2014).
12The reader is referred to Dickson and Fongoni (2016) for more details on the validity of backward induction as
an equilibrium solution concept in this setting.
13All functions considered throughout the analysis are continuously differentiable on their domains unless oth-
erwise specified.
14Notice that by assuming a concave production function (as in, for instance, Dickson and Fongoni (2016)), i.e.
assuming decreasing returns to effort in production, will generate richer out-of-steady-state dynamics. In particular
the concavity of the production function with respect to effort will generate (deterministic) endogenous persistence
in reciprocity and wage dynamics: for example, in the case of a positive shock, firms will optimally implement a
series of wage increases in order to exploit their workers’ positive reciprocity in each period. This, combined with
workers’ adaptation of the reference wage, implies that the marginal gain in effort obtained by firms through wage
rises will decrease over time until a new steady state is reached, the properties of which are analogous to those
derived at the end of this section. As such, the dynamic implications of a more general production function are
not analysed and are left to further research, and notice that this richer dynamics will not affect the predictions of
Sections 3 and 4.
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The instantaneous utility function of an employed worker u : E ×R×W → R is additively
separable and takes the following form
u(et; wt, rt) = m(wt)− c(et) + M(et, wt, rt),
where m :W → R+ captures the effect of absolute wage levels on the worker’s utility; c : E →
R+ captures the worker’s intrinsic psychological and physical net cost of productive activity,15
and the function M(e, w, r) ≡ en(w|r) is the worker’s morale function.
Morale depends on the worker’s evaluation of the wage in relation to the reference wage,
which is captured by the function n :W×R → R. It is assumed that n(w|r) ≡ µ(m(w)−m(r))
where µ is a gain-loss value function that exhibits loss aversion in the spirit of Kahneman and
Tversky’s (1979), Tversky and Kahneman’s (1991) value function and Ko˝szegi and Rabin’s
(2006) universal gain-loss function. Consider the following assumptions:
W1. m is strictly increasing and concave onW .
W2. c is strictly convex on E , with c′(0) < 0 and c′′′(e) = 0.
W3. µ : X → R is continuous, piecewise linear, and strictly increasing on X for all x 6= 0, with
µ(0) = 0. Moreover, for any x > 0, µ′(−x)/µ′(x) ≡ λ ≥ 1.
Assumption W2 essentially implies that u(e; w, r) is strictly concave on E , and that the utility-
maximising level of effort when w = r is non-negative (which will be referred to as ‘normal’
effort); while under assumption W3, the gain-loss utility µ takes the following form:
µ(m(w)−m(r)) =
 η[m(w)−m(r)] if w ≥ rλη[m(w)−m(r)] if w < r (4)
where η > 0 is a scaling parameter that represents the importance of gain-loss utility for the
worker, and λ ≥ 1 represents the worker’s degree of loss aversion.
The morale function captures an additional psychological cost/benefit of productive effort
associated with the worker’s perception of fairness. If the wage exceeds the reference wage
(it is perceived as a gift) the worker gains some additional benefit of productive effort and an
15This function can be considered as the difference between the worker’s physical and psychological costs and
the related psychological benefit of the productive activity. A similar assumption is also considered by Sliwka and
Werner (2017), Kaur (2018) and Macera and te Velde (2018). The reader is referred to Dickson and Fongoni (2016)
for a more thorough discussion.
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increase in effort (a gift to the firm) will increase utility. If the wage falls short of the reference
wage (it is perceived as unfair) there is a psychological cost of productive effort and a reduction
in effort (an ‘unkind’ action towards the firm) increases utility. As such, the morale function
implies the worker’s payoff exhibits reciprocity, and since morale is linked to loss aversion,
negative reciprocity is stronger than positive reciprocity.
2.2.2 Asymmetric reference-dependent reciprocity
This subsection formally derives an employed worker’s optimal effort response to wage offers
in relation to their reference wage. The resulting effort function is identical to the ‘asymmetric
reference-dependent reciprocity’ derived by Dickson and Fongoni (2016). Nevertheless, its
derivation is repeated here for completeness and clarity of exposition.16
For any given sequence of wage offers {wt}∞t=s set by the firm, an employed worker’s {i, j}
problem consists of choosing a sequence of levels of effort {et}∞t=s that maximises their utility,
given their evaluation of the wage in relation to their reference wage rt. In an employment
relationship starting in period t = s, the employed worker’s problem is:
Ws(ws, rs) = max{et}∞t=s
∞
∑
t=s
ψt−su(et; wt, rt)
s.t. wt given ∀t ≥ s
rt+1 = wt, rs given.
(WP)
Ws(ws, rs) is the value function of the employment relationship of a worker hired in period s
(hence a newly hired worker); ψ ∈ (0, 1) is defined as ψ ≡ δ(1− ρ), where δ ∈ (0, 1) is the
discount factor and ρ ∈ (0, 1) is the exogenous job-destruction probability; wt and rt are the
two state variables and et is the worker’s control variable. Notice that the worker’s choice of
effort in each employment period does not affect the evolution of the state variables.
The employed worker’s optimal effort e˜t = e˜(wt, rt, λ), is therefore characterised by the
following first-order condition, which is both necessary and sufficient for an optimum:
− c′(et) +µ(m(wt)−m(rt)) ≤ 0, (5)
16The optimal effort function derived in this section is also related to other asymmetric wage-effort relationships
advanced in the microeconomic literature of reciprocity in labour markets (see for instance the models of Elsby
(2009), Sliwka and Werner (2017) and Macera and te Velde (2018)).
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in which the inequality is replaced with an equality if et > 0.
Theorem 1. (Asymmetric Reference-dependent Reciprocity, Dickson and Fongoni (2016)). For all
t ≥ s, and for any given wage offer wt relative to their reference wage rt, the worker’s optimal effort
function is
e˜t = e˜(wt, rt, λ) =

c′−1(η[m(wt)−m(rt)]) ≡ e˜(wt, rt)+ if wt > rt
c′−1(0) ≡ e˜n if wt = rt
c′−1(λη[m(wt)−m(rt)]) ≡ e˜(wt, rt, λ)− if wt < rt
(6)
where e˜n denotes ‘normal’ effort; e˜(w, r)+ > e˜n denotes ‘positive reciprocity’; and e˜(w, r, λ)− < e˜n
denotes ‘negative reciprocity’. Moreover,
a) For a given r, and for all w 6= r, e˜(w, r, λ) is a continuous, increasing and concave function of w;
and
lim→0 e˜w(r−, r, λ)−
lim→0 e˜w(r +, r)+
= λ,
implying that the optimal effort function has a kink at w = r if λ > 1.17
b) For a given w, and for all w 6= r, e˜(w, r, λ) is a continuous and decreasing function of r; and
e˜wr(w, r, λ) = 0.
c) For all w < r, e˜(w, r, λ) is a continuous and decreasing function of λ; and e˜wλ(w, r, λ)− > 0.
The optimal effort function defined by (6) captures an employed worker’s {i, j} asymmetric
reference-dependent reciprocity. Whenever a worker is paid their reference wage they will exert
normal effort, e˜n, which is independent of the absolute wage level; while the effect on effort
of changes in the wage away from the reference wage is asymmetric for a loss averse worker.
This asymmetry has the implication that from an initial wage equal to the reference wage,
the effect of negative reciprocity that results from a wage cut will be greater than the effect of
positive reciprocity resulting from a wage increase. Moreover, whenever wt < rt, more loss
averse workers will exert less effort, which decreases faster as the wage gets further from the
reference wage. Indeed, if a worker is not loss averse (λ = 1), reciprocity is still reference
dependent, but symmetric.
17Throughout the analysis, where sequences of  are considered over which limits are taken, it is specified that
{n}∞n=1 ⊂ R+, meaning that where the wage is specified to be r− and the limit is taken as→ 0, it is considered
as the wage increasing to the reference wage, and likewise when the wage is specified to be r + and the limit is
taken as → 0, it is considered as the wage decreasing to the reference wage.
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2.2.3 Firms’ optimal wage policy
An operating firm’s wage setting problem consists of choosing a sequence of wages {wt}∞t=s
that maximises its profit, taking as given their employed worker’s {i, j} reference wage rt
and their optimal effort responses, defined by the sequence {e˜t}∞t=s. Since p is parametric and
time invariant, for a given initial period s, an operating firm’s wage setting problem can be
formalised as:
J(rs) = max{wt}∞t=s
∞
∑
t=s
ψt−spi(wt; e˜t)
s.t. e˜t = e˜(wt, rt, λ)
rt+1 = wt, rs given.
(FP)
J(rs) is the firm’s value function of the employment relationship from period s onwards; e˜t
is the optimal effort choice of the worker; rt is the state variable and rt+1 = wt is the control
variable. For any given newly hired worker’s reference wage rs ∈ R in s, at the beginning
of each t ≥ s the firm’s problem consists of setting the optimal wage wt, and hence the next
period reference wage rt+1, taking as given the current reference wage rt.
The firm’s instantaneous profit can be rewritten as a function of wt and rt only, after substi-
tuting for the worker’s optimal effort function. As such:
Lemma 1. The firm’s profit function pi is strictly concave on W and strictly decreasing on R, with
piwr = 0. Moreover pi is supermodular in (p, e).
The relevant functional equation corresponding to the firm’s problem in (FP) can be written
in recursive form:
J(r) = max
w∈W
{y(p, e˜(w, r, λ))− w +ψJ(w)} (7)
where r corresponds to the current period worker’s reference wage and w corresponds to the
current period wage and the following period worker’s reference wage.
Denote the optimal wage policy of an operating firm by w˜ = w˜(r, p, λ), which is charac-
terised by the following first-order condition,18 and which, for convenience, is expressed in
18This is both necessary and sufficient to characterise a maximum. The technical details which ensures that this
is the case, as well as others relevant for the characterisation of the firm’s optimal wage policy, are discussed in the
Proof of Proposition 2.
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terms of the key parameters p and λ (the prime indicates forward values):19
ye(p, e˜)e˜w(w, r, λ)− 1−ψye(p, e˜′)
∣∣e˜r(w′, w, λ)∣∣ = 0 ∀w 6= r (8)
The intuition behind condition (8) is the following. Since the worker’s effort is increasing in
the wage w and decreasing in the reference wage r, the firm will choose the optimal wage such
that the current marginal benefit in terms of positive reciprocity—or less negative reciprocity—
is equalised to the marginal cost of paying a higher wage in the current employment period,
net of the additional expected marginal cost, in terms of effort, of employing a worker with a
higher reference wage in subsequent employment periods.
Proposition 1. The firm’s value function J is strictly concave onW and strictly decreasing onR.
Proposition 2. For all t ≥ s and for any given worker’s reference wage r, the time-invariant optimal
wage policy of an operating firm employing a worker characterised by asymmetric reference-dependent
reciprocity e˜(wt, rt, λ) with λ > 1 and adaptation rt+1 = wt, is given by
w˜t = w˜(rt, p, λ) =

w˜(p)+ > rt if rt < rL(p)
rt if rt ∈ [rL, rH]
w˜(p, λ)− < rt if rt > rH(p, λ);
(9)
where
rL(p) ≡ {rt : lim
→0
ye(p, e˜)e˜w(rt +, rt, λ)− 1 +ψye(p, e˜′)e˜r(w′, rt +, λ) = 0};
rH(p, λ) ≡ {rt : lim
→0
ye(p, e˜)e˜w(rt −, rt, λ)− 1 +ψye(p, e˜′)e˜r(w′, rt −, λ) = 0}.
The optimal wage w˜(p)+(> r) is implicitly defined by (8) in which e˜(w, r, λ) = e˜(w, r)+; and
w˜(p, λ)−(< r) is implicitly defined by (8) in which e˜(w, r, λ) = e˜(w, r, λ)−. Moreover,
a) For all rt ∈ R \ [rL, rH], w˜(rt, p, λ) is increasing in p and independent of rt;
b) For all rt ∈ [rL, rH], w˜(rt, p, λ) is increasing in rt and independent of p;
c) For all rt > rH(p, λ), w˜(p, λ)− is increasing in λ.
19Notice that under assumption F1, ye is independent of e˜; and that due the results established in part b) of
Theorem 1 (namely that e˜wr = 0), e˜w is independent of its second argument and e˜r is independent of its first
argument. These results and their implications for the characterisation of the optimal wage are rigorously derived
in the proof of Proposition 1.
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Finally, rH(p, λ) > rL(p) for all λ > 1 and if λ = 1 then rH(p, 1) = rL(p) and w˜(p)+ = w˜(p, 1)−.
Proposition 2 shows that the firm’s wage setting policy crucially depends on the level of a
worker’s reference wage. If a worker’s reference wage is relatively low, the firm will pay them
a relatively low wage, which will then be perceived as a gift w˜(p)+ > rt; if a worker’s reference
wage is relatively high, the firm will pay them a relatively high wage w˜H(p, λ)− < rt, which
will however be perceived as unfair; while if a worker has a relatively moderate reference
wage rt ∈ [rL, rH], then the firm will pay them their fair wage w˜t = rt. This is illustrated in
Figure 1, which also shows the optimal wage policy with respect to exogenous changes in p.20
(a)
w
rrL(p) rH(p, λ)
w˜(p)+
w˜(p, λ)−
(b)
w
ppl(r, λ) pu(r)
r
w˜(p)+
w˜(p, λ)−
Figure 1:
Optimal Wage Setting Policy
Hence Proposition 2 establishes the existence of a range of worker’s reference wages within
which it is optimal for the firm to pay them their reference wage. This result hinges crucially
on the worker’s asymmetric reference dependent reciprocity that stems from their extent of
loss aversion λ > 1. Whenever a firm is facing a worker with a moderate reference wage
rt ∈ [rL, rH], the marginal benefit of setting a lower, but unfair, wage wt < rt will not be
sufficient to offset the marginal cost generated by the worker’s negative reciprocity; similarly,
the marginal benefit derived from the worker’s positive reciprocity, generated by the wage
wt > rt being perceived as a gift, will not be enough to offset the marginal cost of paying
a higher wage and having to employ a worker with a higher reference wage in the future.
In fact, if reciprocity were symmetric, i.e. if λ = 1, these trade-offs at the margins would
disappear.
Finally note that, by the linearity of the firm’s production function with respect to effort
(i.e. constant returns to effort), whenever the optimal wage is set above or below the worker’s
20From the definitions of rL(p) and rH(p, λ), it is possible to define pl(r, λ) ≡ r−1H (r, λ) and pu(r) ≡ r−1L (r).
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reference wage, this will be independent of the level of the worker’s reference wage.
2.3 Job Creation Condition
The environment described so far is consistent with a labour market in which each period t
is characterised by a number of firms searching for unemployed workers; a number of firms
employing newly hired workers i with reference wage rit who exert optimal effort e˜it; and a
number of firms employing incumbent workers j with reference wage r jt = w˜t−1 who exert
optimal effort e˜ jt, for all t > s.
Let the value of a vacancy to the firm be denoted by Vt; the value of a job filled by a newly
hired worker be denoted by J(rit); and the value of a job filled by an incumbent worker by
J(r jt), in which r jt = wt−1. The value of a job filled by a newly hired worker satisfies
J(rit) = y(p, e˜(w˜t, rit, λ))− w˜t + δ [(1− ρ)J(w˜t) + ρVt+1] ; ri ∼ Γ0, Γ0 given. (10)
Letκ be a time-invariant cost of posting a vacancy. The value of a vacancy for a firm, that is
facing the probability of matching an unemployed worker in period t to start an employment
relationship in the following period, can be expressed as
Vt = −κ + δ [h(θt)Et [J(rit+1)] + (1− h(θt))Vt+1] ; ri ∼ Γ0, Γ0 given, (11)
where Et [J(rit+1)] denotes the expected value in period t of an employment relationship with
a newly hired worker in period t + 1 (recall that firms will learn their new hires’ reference
wage ri only once they are matched).
To derive a condition governing firms’ job creation decisions it is assumed that there is free
entry, i.e. Vt = 0 ∀t. Hence, the optimal vacancy posting decision of firms can be characterised
by the value of θt that satisfies the following job creation condition:
κ
h(θt)
= δEt [J(rit+1)] = δ
∫ r¯
0
J(rit+1) dΓ0(ri). (JC)
2.4 Workers’ Reservation Wage
This section explicitly states the condition that needs to be satisfied by the firms’ optimal wage
offer at the start of an employment relationship, in order for the worker to accept the job and
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stop searching.
For any given rit ∼ Γ0, the value of employment to an incumbent worker j is
W(w˜t, r jt) = u(e˜t(w˜t, r jt, λ), w˜t, r jt) + δ
[
ρU + [1− ρ]W(w˜t+1, r jt+1)
]
; (12)
where w˜t = w˜(r jt, p, λ) = w˜(rit, p, λ). The value of employment to a new hire i is:
W(w˜t, rit) = u(e˜t(w˜t, rit, λ), w˜t, rit) + δ
[
ρU + [1− ρ]W(w˜t+1, r jt+1)
]
; (13)
where w˜t = w˜(rit, p, λ). Finally, the value of unemployment to an unemployed worker is
Ut = u(z) + δ
[
f (θt)E [W(w˜t+1, rit+1)] + [1− f (θt)]Ut
]
; (14)
where u(z) = m(z), and z represents unemployment income.
As such, define a worker’s reservation wage wt as
w(rit, z, e˜n,θt) ≡ {wt :W(wt, rit) = Ut} ;
that is, wit = w(rit, z, e˜n,θt) is the wage offer for which a worker is indifferent between accept-
ing the job or continuing search. So far it has been implicitly assumed that the parameters of
the model are such that W(wt, rit) ≥ Ut. This is equivalent to assume that the parameters of
the model are such that the following condition holds:
u(e˜n, w˜(rit, p, λ), rit) ≥
u(z) + δ f (θt)
∫ r¯
0
u(e˜n, w˜(rit+1, p, λ), rit+1) dΓ0(ri)
1−ψ+ δ f (θt) ; (15)
where the function u captures the present discounted value of utility of being employed at
the wage w˜(rit, p, λ) from t = s onwards, conditional on job destruction (see Section A.2 of
Appendix A for details).21 As shown in Appendix A a calibration of the model reveals that,
for conventional values of z, condition (15) is always satisfied, that is, a worker with reference
wage rit that is matched with a firm offering the wage w˜(rit, p, λ) will always prefer to be hired,
rather than continue searching and receive unemployment income z.
21 Notice that, in the context of the model derived in this paper, equation (15) is the discrete-time analog of the
reservation wage condition derived in Pissarides (2000, p. 150, eq. (6.15)).
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2.5 Aggregation and Steady-state Equilibrium
The control variables of the system are: the employed workers’ {i, j} optimal effort choice e˜t,
which maximises utility given their matched firm’s optimal wage offer w˜t evaluated relative
to their reference wage rt; the optimal wage policy of firms w˜t, which maximises their present
discounted value of profit taking as given their employed workers’ reference wage rt; and the
level of vacancies, subsumed by labour market tightnessθt, that satisfies the job creation condi-
tion, taking as given the expected present discounted value of a new employment relationship
Et [J(rit+1)] for any given ri ∼ Γ0, where the optimal wage paid and the employed workers’
reciprocity are endogenously determined by their respective optimisation problems.
The state variables of the system are the employed workers’ reference wage rt and the
unemployment rate ut. The laws of motion describing their evolution are reproduced here for
clarity of exposition:
rt+1 = w˜(rt, p, λ), r0 ∼ Γ0, Γ0 given; (16)
ut+1 = ut + ρ(1− ut)− f (θt)ut, u0 given. (17)
To fully characterise the steady-state equilibrium of the model this section derives first the
steady-state levels of wages, reference wages and effort, and subsequently uses these results to
derive the steady-state levels of market tightness and unemployment. Note that these can be
derived independently as two distinct blocks, since firms’ optimal wage policy is independent
of labour market tightness and unemployment.22
Proposition 3. The steady-state levels of wages, reference wages and effort in the labour market are
characterised as follows:
a) The steady-state aggregate wage paid to employed (newly hired and incumbent) workers {i, j} in
22The result that wage setting is independent of labour market tightness in this model is due to the assumption
that the distribution of new hires reference wages in the market is exogenous. As such the vacancy rate and the
unemployment rate do not affect the optimal effort choice of workers, neither the wage setting behaviour of firms.
The same result has also been obtained in the literature by, for instance, Eliaz and Spiegler (2014), who assume that
workers have no bargaining power, and Hall and Milgrom (2008), who assume that the workers’ threats of quitting
to unemployment is not credible. Investigating the consequences of a distribution of new hires’ reference wages Γ0
that is dependent of the state of the labour market is beyond the scope of this paper.
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the labour market is given by
W∗(Γ0, p, λ) =
∫ rL(p)
0
w˜∗(p)+ dΓ0(ri) +
∫ rH(p,λ)
rL(p)
r∗i dΓ0(ri)
+
∫ r¯
rH(p,λ)
w˜∗(p, λ)− dΓ0(ri). (18)
b) Newly hired workers’ steady-state aggregate level of the reference wage is given by
R∗i (Γ0) =
∫ r¯
0
r∗i dΓ0(ri); (19)
while their steady-state aggregate level of effort is given by
E∗i (Γ0, p, λ) =
∫ rL(p)
0
e˜∗(w˜∗(p)+, r∗i )
+ dΓ0(ri) +
∫ rH(p,λ)
rL(p)
e˜∗n dΓ0(ri)
+
∫ r¯
rH(p,λ)
e˜∗(w˜∗(p, λ)−, r∗i , λ)
− dΓ0(ri). (20)
c) Incumbent workers’ steady-state aggregate level of the reference wage is given by
R∗j (Γ0, p, λ) =
∫ r¯
0
r∗j dΓ0(ri) =
∫ r¯
0
w˜∗(r∗i , p, λ) dΓ0(ri) = W
∗(Γ0, p, λ); (21)
while their steady-state aggregate level of effort is given by
E∗j =
∫ r¯
0
e˜∗(w˜∗, r∗j , λ) dΓ0(ri) = e˜
∗
n. (22)
Note that these are both steady-state averages and expected values. Proposition 3 estab-
lishes a clear distinction between new hires and incumbent workers wages, reference wages,
and effort levels in the steady state.
Depending on their initial reference wage, there will be a fraction of new hires that is paid a
wage gift w˜∗ > r∗i and will exert positive reciprocity in their first employment period; a fraction
of new hires that is paid a wage perceived as unfair w˜∗ < r∗i , triggering negative reciprocity
in their first employment period; and a fraction of new hires that is paid their reference wage
w˜∗ = r∗i and therefore will exert normal effort e˜n. On the other hand, independently of the
absolute level of the steady-state wage and their initial reference wage, due to reference wage
adaptation incumbent workers always perceive their wage as fair, and therefore will exert
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normal effort. As such, while firms employing new hires i may expect to experience positive
or negative reciprocity in the first employment period, those employing incumbent workers j
will always experience normal effort.
Denote by J(rt)+, J(rt)=, and J(rt)− the value of an employment relationship with a worker
{i, j} in period t in which a the firm is paying the wage w˜(p)+, rit, and w˜(p, λ)− respectively.
Using the results derived thus far it is possible to establish the following:
Lemma 2. The steady-state expected value of an employment relationship to firms takes the form
E[J(r∗i )] =
∫ rL(p)
0
J(r∗i )
+ dΓ0(ri) +
∫ rH(p,λ)
rL(p)
J(r∗i )
= dΓ0(ri) +
∫ r¯
rH(p,λ)
J(r∗i )
− dΓ0(ri); (23)
where J(r∗i )
+ > J(r∗i )
= > J(r∗i )
−. Moreover, due to assumption A2, the following holds:
J(r∗i )
+ > J(r∗j )
+ if ri < rL(p)
J(r∗i )
= = J(r∗j )
= if ri ∈ [rL, rH]
J(r∗i )
− < J(r∗j )
− if ri > rH(p, λ).
Note that (23) is also the steady-state average value of an employment relationship to firms.
Lemma 2 implies that the value of a job filled by a new hire does not always necessarily equal
the value of a job filled by an incumbent worker. Notice that in the canonical model there is
no such distinction, since wages are re-negotiated at each period and there is no link between
one employment period and the next. In fact, even though an employment relationship starts
with some degree of positive or negative reciprocity, the value of the job to the firm once a
worker becomes incumbent will either shrink or increase due to the dynamic re-normalisation
of effort stemming from incumbent workers’ reference wage adaptation. As such, the present
framework endogenously generates a systematic difference between the output produced by
newly formed and existing matches.
Denote the steady-state equilibrium labour market tightness by θ˜∗ = θ˜∗(Γ0, p, λ), which
is characterised by the solution to (JC); and denote the steady-state unemployment rate by
u∗ = u∗(Γ0, p, λ), which is characterised by the following condition representing the Beveridge
Curve:
u∗ =
ρ
ρ+ f (θ˜∗)
. (BC)
Proposition 4. There exists a unique steady-state equilibrium labour market tightness θ˜∗(Γ0, p, λ)
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that satisfies the job creation condition (JC); and a unique steady-state equilibrium unemployment rate
u∗(Γ0, p, λ) that satisfies condition (BC).
2.5.1 Some Comparative Statics Results
This section investigates some comparative statics properties of the steady state equilibrium.
These results will be useful to asses the qualitative relevance of the mechanisms that underlie
how the model responds to exogenous shocks.
First, consider the effect of aggregate productivity p.
Proposition 5. W∗(Γ0, p, λ), R∗j (Γ0, p, λ), and E
∗
i (Γ0, p, λ) are increasing in p. Moreover, θ˜
∗(Γ0, p, λ)
is increasing in p, implying that u∗(Γ0, p, λ) is decreasing in p.
Proposition 5 establishes that, in line with the prediction of the canonical model, wages
and labour market tightness are increasing in aggregate productivity, while unemployment
is decreasing in p.23 In addition, it also highlights two distinct predictions with respect to
incumbent workers’ reference wages and new hires’ effort. In particular, the higher steady-
state wage implies that: new hires’ effort will be higher, since for a given reference wage r∗i ,
new hires’ effort is increasing in the wage they are paid, which is increasing in p; and, due to
reference wage adaptation, incumbent workers’ reference wages will also be higher.
Next, consider the effect of workers’ loss aversion λ.
Proposition 6. W∗(Γ0, p, λ), R∗j (Γ0, p, λ), are increasing in λ, while the effect of λ on E
∗
i (Γ0, p, λ) is
ambiguous. Moreover, θ˜∗(Γ0, p, λ) is decreasing in λ, implying that u∗(Γ0, p, λ) is increasing in λ.
A higher coefficient of loss aversion implies that workers’ negative reciprocity will be
stronger, that is, whenever a worker is paid a wage below their reference wage, their opti-
mal effort will be lower. However, the equilibrium outcome of a higher λ on the steady-state
level of new hires’ effort is ambiguous. This is because, in the anticipation of stronger negative
reciprocity, firms’ employing newly hired workers with r∗i ∈ (rH , r¯] will set a relatively higher
wage in order to stimulate higher effort, partially offsetting the increase in negative reciprocity.
Since effort is increasing in the wage but decreasing in the reference wage, whether new hires’
23As explained by Pissarides (2000), this is not a desirable property of a model in long-run equilibrium, where
wages should fully absorb productivity changes and there should exist a balanced-growth equilibrium with con-
stant unemployment. In the canonical model, one way to make the unemployment rate independent of aggregate
productivity is to assume that workers’ “unemployment income” depends on their “permanent income” (see Pis-
sarides, 1987). However since the comparative statics results in this section should be considered as approximations
of the short-run dynamic adjustment of the model following a shock this issue shall not be addressed here.
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effort increases or decreases with λ depends on which of these two aforementioned effect dom-
inates. Note that the latter effect also implies a higher wage paid to incumbent workers for the
entire duration of the employment relationship, who, however, will exert normal effort due to
their reference wage adaptation. Despite these considerations it is possible to conclude that
a higher degree of loss aversion—which essentially captures the anticipation of a greater cost
of hiring ‘de-moralised’ workers—unambiguously reduces firms’ expected value of new em-
ployment relationships, resulting in fewer vacancies and higher unemployment.
Finally consider the effect of changes in the distribution of new hires’ reference wages Γ0.
Proposition 7. Consider two initial distributions Γ0 and Γ ′0, where Γ
′
0 is first-order stochastic domi-
nant over Γ0. Then, W∗(Γ ′0, p, λ) > W
∗(Γ0, p, λ), R∗j (Γ
′
0, p, λ) > R
∗
j (Γ0, p, λ), and E
∗
i (Γ
′
0, p, λ) <
E∗i (Γ0, p, λ). Moreover, θ˜
∗(Γ ′0, p, λ) < θ˜
∗(Γ0, p, λ), implying that u∗(Γ ′0, p, λ) > u
∗(Γ0, p, λ).
Proposition 7 establishes that if the reference wage of new hires is expected to be higher,
then firms will expect having to pay a higher wage to those workers for which is optimal to
pay them their reference wage. This, in turn, raises the steady-state aggregate wage and, due
to adaptation, the steady-state aggregate reference wage of incumbent workers. Moreover,
a higher expected reference wage from new hires also implies that the expected level of ef-
fort, exerted by those new hires for which firms would optimally pay a wage above or below
their reference wage, is lower. These considerations enable to conclude that the expectations
by firms of employing new hires with, on average, relatively higher reference wages will de-
crease the expected present value of new employment relationships, reducing job creation and
increasing unemployment.
This result emphasises the important role of newly hired workers’ wage entitlements in the
market for the determination of unemployment in equilibrium.
3 Unemployment Volatility: New Hires’ Wage Cyclicality
This section implements the framework developed in Section 2 to derive and analyse the
volatility of labour market tightness with respect to aggregate productivity. A particular em-
phasis will be placed on the role of new hires’ wage cyclicality for the volatility of job creation
and unemployment. In so doing, this section contributes to the labour market literature that
aims to explain the amplitude and co-movement of vacancies and unemployment fluctuations.
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3.1 A Concise Discussion of the Relevant Literature
The analysis of the steady-state elasticity of labour market tightness with respect to produc-
tivity (referred to as the elasticity of market tightness henceforth) is commonly used as a good
approximation of the volatility of vacancies and unemployment when the labour market is hit
by exogenous shocks to aggregate productivity (Mortensen and Nagypál, 2007; Elsby et al.,
2015). Moreover, as shown by Shimer (2005), this elasticity is particularly important for the as-
sessment of the quantitative implications of the model: a greater elasticity of market tightness
implies that job creation is more responsive to exogenous shocks in productivity.
In a highly influential paper Shimer (2005) calibrates a canonical search and matching
model and shows that the model cannot quantitatively account for the high volatility of the
vacancy-unemployment ratio observed in U.S. data over the period 1951–2003 (see Amaral
and Tasci (2016) for a comparable exercise on a set of OECD countries). This quantitative failure
has been labelled as “the unemployment volatility puzzle” (Pissarides, 2009). Shimer’s insight
is that the wage response to productivity shocks predicted by the model is too large, i.e. the
elasticity of the wage with respect to productivity is close to unity, offsetting almost all the
effect of the productivity shock on job creation. Hence, introducing a degree of wage sticki-
ness will improve the model’s explanatory power. Subsequent to Shimer (2005) the literature
attempting to solve the puzzle has flourished, and two main streams of thought have been
developed.
On one hand, following the suggestion of Shimer (2005) and starting with the contribution
of Hall (2005b), a large body of literature has placed considerable emphasis on the role of the
cyclicality of wages by proposing alternative wage determination mechanisms that can gener-
ate some form of wage rigidity, i.e. acyclicality, or wage stickiness, i.e. less than proportional
cyclicality. For surveys of this literature see, for instance, Mortensen and Nagypál (2007) and
Rogerson and Shimer (2011). Given the emphasis on the cyclical behaviour of job creation,
these models have stressed the importance of rigidities in newly hired workers’ wages, which,
as shown by Pissarides (2009), is the relevant wage affecting hiring decisions in the canonical
model. However, the more recent empirical literature has challenged the theory underlying
these models by providing evidence that wages offered to newly hired workers are instead
substantially pro-cyclical (Martins et al., 2012; Carneiro et al., 2012; Haefke et al., 2013; Stüber,
2017; Schaefer and Singleton, 2017). Building on these findings, Kudlyak (2014) has shown that
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it is not the hiring wage that is the relevant price of labour for firms, but rather, it is the user cost
of labour, i.e. the opportunity cost of delaying hiring decisions. By providing estimates of this
measure, and showing that it can be even more pro-cyclical than the hiring wage, Kudlyak
(2014) concludes that wage rigidity is not relevant to address the unemployment volatility
puzzle.
A different perspective in response to Shimer’s critique has been elucidated by Mortensen
and Nagypál (2007), Hagedorn and Manovskii (2008) and Pissarides (2009) among others.
These authors have argued that the literature has put too much emphasis on the role of newly
hired workers’ wage cyclicality. Even if hiring wages were more sticky, for this to have a sub-
stantive effect on the size of the elasticity of market tightness, the present value of the wage
would also need to be sufficiently high relative to the firm’s present value of output from a
new match (Elsby et al., 2015). As such, what matters for job creation is the size of the present
value of the profit margin from a new employment relationship (Kennan, 2010), i.e. the differ-
ence between the present values of output and the wage: only if this margin is small enough
will slight changes in productivity generate large fluctuations in the anticipated profits from
new matches, and hence in vacancy creation and unemployment. This perspective, which
Ljungqvist and Sargent (2017) summarised under the concept of the “fundamental surplus”,
downplays the role of new hires’ wage rigidity and shifts the focus to the size of the surplus
generated by new employment relationships.
To understand the key insights of these arguments more clearly in the context of this paper,
denote the present discounted value of wages and output derived in the present framework as
follows:
W∗ ≡ E
[ ∞
∑
t=s
ψt−sw˜∗(r∗t , p, λ)
]
=
W∗
1−ψ ; (24)
Y
∗
(E∗) ≡ E
[ ∞
∑
t=s
ψt−s y(p, e˜∗(w˜∗, r∗t , λ))
]
= y(p, E∗i ) +
ψ
1−ψ y(p, e˜n). (25)
As such, the expected present value to firms of new employment relationships in the steady
state can be expressed as E [J(r∗i )] = Y
∗
(E∗)−W∗. Next, denote the elasticity of any variable
x with respect to productivity p as εxp =
p
x
dx
dp , and consider the following proposition.
Proposition 8. The elasticity of labour market tightness with respect to aggregate productivity takes
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the form:
εθ˜∗p =
1
σ
Y
∗
(E∗)−Λ(εw˜∗p , W
∗
)
Y
∗
(E∗)−W∗ (26)
where Λ is a function of the elasticity of wages with respect to productivity εw˜∗p , the present discounted
value of wages W∗, and other parameters of the model.
Proposition 8 derives an equation for the elasticity of labour market tightness that is di-
rectly comparable with the literature (see for instance Pissarides (2009), equation (20), p.1352;
or Elsby et al. (2015), equation (11), p.590).24 In the canonical model: Y
∗
(E∗) = p/(1 −ψ);
W∗ = w/(1 − ψ) (where w is the outcome of generalised Nash bargaining solution); and
Λ(εw˜∗p , W
∗
) = εwp w/(1−ψ). Hence, (26) can be expressed as
εθp =
1
σ
p−εwp w
p− w ,
implying that the size of the elasticity of market tightness hinges crucially on the size of the
elasticity of wages εwp . Indeed if εwp = 1 wages are perfectly proportional to changes in pro-
ductivity and the elasticity equation collapses to εθp = 1/σ , implying that its size depends
crucially on the elasticity of the matching function with respect to unemployment σ ∈ (0, 1).
As shown in the literature cited above, for values of σ ∈ [0.235, 0.72] the model fails to gen-
erate the target elasticity of εθp = 7.56
25 (see Mortensen and Nagypál (2007), Pissarides (2009)
and Kudlyak (2014)). This numerical exercise reproduces, in essence, the analysis underlying
the insight of Shimer (2005): by implementing a wage setting mechanism that yields an elas-
ticity of wages with respect to productivity lower than unity εwp < 1, i.e. by introducing some
sort of wage rigidity εwp = 0, or stickiness εwp ∈ (0, 1), the size of εθp will increase, improving
the explanatory power of the model.
Ignoring the empirical estimates of εwp for the time being, consider the solution proposed
by Hall (2005b), in which wages are entirely acyclical, i.e. εwp = 0. In such a case the canonical
version of equation (26) can be rewritten as
εθp =
1
σ
p
p− w .
It is clear from this expression that, even if wages are entirely rigid, the size of the elasticity
24The discussion that follows draws on Pissarides (2009) and Elsby et al. (2015).
25This figure corresponds to the regression coefficient in a simple regression with labour market tightness as the
dependent variable and productivity as the independent variable.
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of market tightness depends crucially on the firms’ profit margin—the fundamental surplus—
from new employment relationships. As pointed out in the previous discussion of the litera-
ture, the higher the wage relative to the value of output from a new match the lower the profit
margin and therefore the greater the size of the elasticity of market tightness (Elsby et al., 2015).
To conclude this brief excursus around the determinants of the size of εθp , notice that the
empirical literature has estimated the cyclicality of hiring wages to be around 1.26 This find-
ing supports the aforementioned conclusions reached by Kudlyak (2014), that the volatility of
the hiring wage is not useful to explain the high volatility of vacancies and unemployment
observed in the data; and that the canonical model cannot simultaneously accommodate the
empirical volatilities of the wage component of the user cost of labour and of the vacancy-
unemployment ratio.
How does the framework developed in this paper contribute to the arguments highlighted
above? By analysing the qualitative properties of the model with an emphasis on the role of
new hires’ wage and effort cyclicality, it will be shown that the behavioural mechanisms con-
sidered in this paper can provide a novel perspective on the channels through which vacancies
and unemployment fluctuations can be amplified.
3.2 Reciprocity and the Irrelevance of New Hires’ Wage Cyclicality
In order to assess the role of new hires’ wage cyclicality for the size of the elasticity of labour
market tightness in the model set out in this paper, it is necessary to characterise the function
Λ. As derived in detail in the Proof of Proposition 8, Λ(εw˜∗p , W
∗
) takes the following form:
Λ(εw˜∗p , W
∗
) ≡ −
( ∫ rL(p)
0
[
ye e˜∗w(w˜∗+, r∗i )
+ ·εw˜∗+p w˜∗+
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
∆e≷0 e f f ort response
− εw˜∗+p
w˜∗+
1−ψ︸ ︷︷ ︸
∆w≷0 wage adjustment
dΓ0(ri)
−
∫ rH(p,λ)
rL(p)
εw˜∗=p
w˜∗=
1−ψ︸ ︷︷ ︸
∆w=0 wage rigidity
dΓ0(ri)
+
∫ r¯
rH(p,λ)
[
ye e˜∗w(w˜∗−, r∗i , λ)
− ·εw˜∗−p w˜∗−
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
∆e≷0 e f f ort response
− εw˜∗−p
w˜∗−
1−ψ︸ ︷︷ ︸
∆w≷0 wage adjustment
dΓ0(ri)
)
. (27)
26For instance, Carneiro et al. (2012) provide an estimate of εwp = 1.07; Haefke et al. (2013) an estimate of
εwp = 0.8; and Schaefer and Singleton (2017) an estimate of εwp ∈ [0.82, 0.88] for the UK; while using the estimates
of Pissarides (2009), Kudlyak (2014) computes a combined elasticity (of the user cost of labour) of εwp = 1.5.
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First notice that Λ(εw˜∗p , W
∗
) is a function of the elasticity of the wage of newly hired workers
εw˜∗p for any given initial reference wage ri ∈ [0, r¯] and, in contrast with other expressions ad-
vanced in the literature discussed above, is also a function of the marginal change in firms’ output
induced by a change in new hires’ effort, which is triggered by the change in the wage for any
given ri ∈ [0, r¯] \ [rL, rH] (see the terms in square brackets).
The interpretation of (27) is as follows. Whenever the labour market is hit by an exogenous
shock to productivity p, firms will expect to be in one of two main situations at the start of
the employment relationship. On one hand, firms anticipate that if they are matched with
workers with moderate reference wages ri ∈ [rL, rH] they will optimally set a wage equal to
their reference wage, which is independent of aggregate productivity. That is, firms anticipate
that there is a positive probability of not adjusting the wage for these workers, to avoid the
adverse effects of negative reciprocity. As such, εw˜∗=p = 0 for all ri ∈ [rL, rH].27 On the other
hand, firms will also anticipate being in a situation in which if they are matched with workers
with relatively low ri ∈ [0, rL) or relatively high ri ∈ (rH , r¯] reference wages, then they will
adjust the wage to the change in p, as implied by their optimal wage policy (9). However,
since as implied by (6) workers’ effort optimally responds to wage changes above and below
the reference wage, firms also anticipate that any change in the wage of these workers will
trigger a change in their effort response, in the form of positive and negative reciprocity. These
two marginal effects are in fact optimally balanced by the wage paid to new hires, for all
ri ∈ [0, r¯] \ [rL, rH]. That is:
[
ye e˜∗w(w˜∗+, r∗i )
+ ·εw˜∗+p w˜∗+
]
−εw˜∗+p
w˜∗+
1−ψ = 0 ∀ri ∈ [0, rL); and[
ye e˜∗w(w˜∗−, r∗i , λ)
− ·εw˜∗−p w˜∗−
]
−εw˜∗−p
w˜∗−
1−ψ = 0 ∀ri ∈ (rH , r¯],
by virtue of the first-order condition (8), characterising the optimal wage setting policy of
firms.28 As such, the first and last term in (27) are zero, independently of the size of the elas-
27This particular case reproduces the result generated by the model based on “norms” proposed, and analysed,
by Hall (2005b). Moreover, the wage setting model implemented here provides a micro-founded rationale—based
on fairness and loss aversion—that endogenously generates rigidity in the wage of newly hired workers for a range
of initial reference wages.
28Consider the case ri ∈ [0, rL). Collecting the term εw˜∗+p w˜
∗+
1−ψ as the common factor yields:
εw˜∗+p
w˜∗+
1−ψ
{
[1−ψ]ye e˜∗+w − 1
}
,
in which, as established in the Proof of Proposition 1 (see equation (48)), the term in curly brackets is equivalent
to the first-order condition (8) characterising the optimal wage, and is therefore equal to zero. The same argument
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ticity of newly hired workers’ wages εw˜∗+,−p .
These considerations underlie the statement of the proposition capturing the first main
result of this paper:
Proposition 9. (Irrelevance Proposition). Since Λ(εw˜∗p , W
∗
) = 0 for any given
∫ r¯
0 εw˜∗p dΓ0(ri), the
elasticity of labour market tightness is:
εθ˜∗p =
1
σ
Y
∗
(E∗)
Y
∗
(E∗)−W∗ ; (28)
which implies that the elasticity of the hiring wage with respect to productivity εw˜∗p is irrelevant for the
size of the elasticity of labour market tightness εθ˜∗p .
In contrast with a large body of the existing literature, Proposition 9 establishes that the
cyclicality of the hiring wage with respect to productivity is irrelevant for the determination of
the size of the elasticity of market tightness. Note that this conclusion holds for any value of
the elasticity of the hiring wage, hence irrespectively of the specific value corresponding to its
empirical estimate.
For any given change in aggregate productivity firms anticipate either keeping the wage
constant at the workers’ reference wage, or setting a wage that will optimally balance the inter-
temporal trade-off between the marginal cost of a higher wage, and the marginal benefit, on
output y, generated by the workers’ reciprocity (to satisfy the first-order condition (8)). As
such, for all ri ∈ [0, r¯] \ [rL, rH] it does not matter how responsive new hires’ wages are to
productivity, since firms optimally exploit this response by inducing a counteracting response
in workers’ effort, which positively (or negatively) affects output and leaves room for the im-
pact of the change in productivity to be reflected in the firms’ present value of output. Using
a terminology familiar with the literature discussed above (e.g. Haefke et al. (2013)), when
aggregate productivity increases, firms anticipate being able to turn the additional surplus re-
ceived by workers, in the form of a higher wage, into an additional surplus that they receive, in
the form of higher effort exerted by newly hired workers, which increases their output y. This
is the reason why, in the model developed in this paper, the elasticity of the hiring wage with
respect to productivity is irrelevant for job creation; and changes in aggregate productivity are
fully absorbed by firms’ present value of profit.
Note that this conclusion remains qualitatively valid even if reciprocity were symmetric,
applies for the case ri ∈ (rH , r¯] .
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i.e. if λ = 1. In this case:
Λ(εw˜∗p , W
∗
) = −
(∫ r¯
0
[
ye e˜∗w(w˜∗, r∗i ) ·εw˜∗p w˜∗
]
−εw˜∗p
w˜∗
1−ψ dΓ0(ri)
)
,
which again is equal to zero for all ri ∈ [0, r¯] by virtue of the first-order condition (8). Moreover,
at this stage, it is also clear why in the canonical model Λ(εw˜∗p , W
∗
) = εw˜∗p w˜
∗/(1 − ψ): by
neglecting the impact of wage changes on workers’ effort (captured by the term in square
brackets), the model only considers the marginal cost of a higher wage on firms’ profits.
This qualitative result is particularly important for two reasons. First it reinforces the ar-
gument summarised in Elsby et al. (2015), that besides the extent of cyclicality of new hires’
wages, it is the anticipated present value of the firms’ profit margin that matters for the size
of the elasticity of labour market tightness. Second, in contrast with a large body of literature
that started from the influential contribution of Shimer (2005), it shows that, in the presence of
a positive wage-effort relationship in the production function, the extent of new hires’ wage
cyclicality is irrelevant for the volatility of vacancies and unemployment.
Finally notice that the framework developed here falls into the class of models in which
the wage component of the user cost of labour—defined by Kudlyak (2014) as the difference
between the expected present value of wages paid to a worker hired in t and the one paid
to a worker hired in t + 1—is equal to the wage. As such, this framework will be consistent
with any empirical estimate of the cyclicality of the relevant price for labour at the time of
hiring, and will be able to generate outcomes that are quantitatively consistent with plausible
empirical estimates of the volatilities of both the hiring wage and the vacancy-unemployment
ratio. To reinforce these conclusions, a calibration of the model consistent with an elasticity of
labour market tightness of 7.56 and an elasticity of the hiring wage of 0.8 (Haefke et al., 2013)
is performed in Section A.1, Appendix A.
4 Unemployment Volatility: Incumbents’ DownwardWage Rigidity
The analysis of the previous section has established that the cyclicality of newly hired workers’
wages is irrelevant for the volatility of job creation. However, if the wage of incumbent workers
is expected to be rigid, what is the role of this expectation for firms’ hiring decisions?
In his influential paper Pissarides (2009) addressed this question by showing that even if
the wage of incumbent workers were entirely rigid, firms will be able to internalise these future
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rigidities in the equilibrium wage negotiated with their new hires at the start of the employ-
ment relationship, leaving the volatility of job creation unaffected by the expected rigidity of
wages in subsequent employment periods. This theoretical result is general and holds true also
under various modifications of the canonical model put forward to address the unemployment
volatility puzzle (which, as discussed, have focused on the cyclicality of newly hired workers’
wages).
This conclusion has been recently re-evaluated from different perspectives by two promi-
nent studies. Within a framework based on reference dependence, incomplete contracts and
fairness, Eliaz and Spiegler (2014) challenge Pissarides’ theoretical result with the following
qualitative insight. In a model where there is uncertainty around the evolution of productiv-
ity and wage rigidity of incumbent workers generates ex-post inefficient layoffs, the latter can
negatively affect the expected present value of a new employment relationship by reducing its
expected duration (essentially working as an additional discount factor). As such, Eliaz and
Spiegler (2014) conclude that expected wage rigidity of incumbent workers can negatively
influence the volatility of job creation.29 However, Eliaz and Spiegler (2014) are unable to de-
termine whether the extent to which the labour contract is incomplete—which is their relevant
source of downward wage rigidity—unambiguously increases the volatility of vacancies and
unemployment.
In a different vein, Bils et al. (2016) study a search and matching model with large firms,
in which existing workers’ wages are rigid (due to a staggered Nash bargaining mechanism),
and their effort is observable and contractible (i.e. the employment contract is complete). This
framework is used to show quantitatively that existing workers’ rigidity can negatively affect
firms’ hiring decisions. According to their model, whenever there is a negative productivity
shock and the wage of existing workers does not fall, by the completeness of the labour con-
tract firms would require existing workers to be more productive. This in turn would lower
the marginal value of hiring a new worker, reducing job creation and raising unemployment.
The contribution made in this section is to provide an alternative and complementary per-
spective to the insights advanced by Eliaz and Spiegler (2014) and Bils et al. (2016). To do so the
29The prediction that expected wage rigidity dampens hiring incentives by reducing the expected duration of
a match does not appear to be supported by the available evidence (e.g. Hall (2005a) and Shimer (2012)): the
observed stability of the unemployment inflow rate during the more recent recessions downplays the role of job
duration in determining hiring decisions (see Hall’s comments to Eliaz and Spiegler (2014) in the same volume).
Moreover, as shown by Moscarini, the volatility of the vacancy-unemployment ratio in the model of Eliaz and
Spiegler (2014) is maximised when reference-dependence and wage rigidity do not play any role (see comments
from Moscarini in the same volume).
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framework developed in this paper is extended by introducing uncertainty around the evolu-
tion of an employed worker’s match productivity throughout the employment relationship. In
this context it is shown that if the employment contract is incomplete (in contrast to Bils et al.
(2016)), and even if incumbent workers’ wage rigidity does not generate endogenous layoffs
(as it does in Eliaz and Spiegler (2014)), firms’ expectations of the relatively large cost of imple-
menting wage cuts in the event of a low realisation of future match productivity—that is, the
anticipation of stronger negative reciprocity by incumbent workers—can negatively influence
the expected present value of new employment relationships, dampening hiring incentives
and increasing the volatility of job creation and unemployment.
4.1 Introducing Idiosyncratic Uncertainty
For the purpose of the analysis in this section the model is extended by including a time-
variant, idiosyncratic match productivity qt characterising worker-firm matches. In particular,
q ∈ Q enters firms’ output function equivalently to the aggregate productivity p as stated in
Assumption F1. As such, y : P ×Q× E → R+ is strictly increasing and linear on Q× E , with
yeq > 0.
U1. The idiosyncratic match productivity qt of employed workers {i, j} evolves according to
the following stochastic process:
q jt+1 = g(qit,ξ), qit given; (29)
whereξ ∈ Z ⊂ R is a shock with cumulative distribution function G, and g : Q×Z → Q
is a given function.
Assumption U1 implies that employed workers’ match productivity changes stochastically
after the first employment period and remain constant for the entire duration of the employ-
ment relationship. The dynamics of this process is implied by g and G, and can be repre-
sented by a transition probability function Q onQ, denoted in this particular case by Q(qi, dq j).
Hence, in contrast with the analysis of Section 3, while new hires’ match productivity is exoge-
nously given at the start of the employment relationship, the match productivity of incumbents
is now allowed to change stochastically. The purpose of this assumption is to introduce a form
of uncertainty faced by firms at the time of hiring, whom might have to re-adjust wages in the
future in the event of exogenous unanticipated changes in per-worker output. The choice to
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model uncertainty as a two-period stochastic process is motivated mainly for tractability, and
to allow analytical characterisation of the model’s steady state and subsequent analysis. An-
other way to achieve this would have been to impose a two-period employment relationship
(as, for instance, in Dickson and Fongoni (2016) or Eliaz and Spiegler (2014)).
U2. The shock ξ follows a log-normal distribution so that lnξ ∼ N (0,ν2); and workers’ nor-
mal effort is sufficiently high: e˜n ≥ en(ξ), where en(ξ) ≡ max{e˜n : J(r j, q j) = 0}.
Assumption U2 is instrumental in eliminating the possibility of endogenous job destruction
once q j is realised. In particular, the assumption on the distribution of ξ ensures that q j
is non-negative; while the assumption on e˜n ensures that workers’ normal effort—which is
parametric—is such that the value of a job filled by an incumbent worker is always profitable
to the firm, independently of the realisation of q j. Hence, incumbent workers are never en-
dogenously laid off and additions into unemployment remain determined by the exogenous
job destruction rate ρ.
U3. New hires’ reference wage is set to zero: rit = 0.
Assumption U3 implies that newly hired workers are characterised by ‘relatively low’ refer-
ence wages at the start of the employment relationship.30 The main reason for imposing this
assumption is to ensure that firms’ optimal wage in the first employment period is perceived
as a gift, which implies that new hires always exert positive reciprocity. As a consequence,
new hires’ wages will be entirely procyclical (since ri ∈ [0, rL) for all ri). This enables to isolate
the analysis of the impact of negative reciprocity (and hence downward wage rigidity) on the
expected continuation value of new employment relationships with prospective incumbent
workers.
4.2 The Firms’ Problem and Wage Setting Behaviour
Given Assumptions U1-U3, the firms’ wage setting problem at the start of the employment
relationship t = s can be thought as being divided into two separated optimisation problems.
Since an incumbent worker’s match productivity remains constant after it is revealed, a firm
can: i) derive the optimal wage policy for any possible realisation of q j, taking as given r j
for all t > s; then ii) use the obtained ‘state-contingent’ optimal wage policy to calculate the
30This is analogous to the assumption of “modest aspirations” imposed by Eliaz and Spiegler (2014).
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continuation value of an employment relationship with an incumbent worker J(r j, q j) for any
possible realisation of q j, the expectation of which is crucial for the characterisation of the
optimal wage policy in t = s. This two-step structure can be expressed recursively as:
J(ri, qi) =max
w∈W
{
pi(ri, w, qi) +ψ
∫
J(w, q j)Q(qi, dq j)
}
, (30)
where J(r j, q j) = max
w∈W
{
pi(r j, w, q j) +ψJ(w, q j)
}
, (31)
Notice that since q j is constant from t > s onwards, the functional equation (31), corre-
sponding to the wage setting problem faced by a firm employing an incumbent worker, is
analogous to the functional equation (7), as analysed in the previous section. The following
proposition establishes the solution to (30-31).
Proposition 10. The optimal wage policy of firms employing workers {i, j} which solves the wage
setting problem (30-31) is characterised as follows.
a) The optimal wage policy of firms employing incumbent workers j characterised by asymmetric
reference-dependent reciprocity e˜(wt, r jt, λ) with λ > 1 and adaptation r jt+1 = wt is given by
w˜ jt = w˜(r jt, p, q jt, λ) =

w˜(p, q jt)+ if q jt > qu(r jt)
r jt if q jt ∈ [ql , qu]
w˜(p, q jt, λ)− if q jt < ql(r jt, λ);
(32)
where
qu(r jt) ≡ {q jt : lim
→0
piw(r jt, r jt +, q jt) +ψJr(r jt +, q jt) = 0};
ql(r jt, λ) ≡ {q jt : lim
→0
piw(r jt, r jt −, q jt) +ψJr(r jt −, q jt) = 0}.
b) The optimal wage policy of firms employing newly hired workers i characterised by asymmetric
reference-dependent reciprocity e˜(wt, rit, λ) with λ > 1 and rit = 0 is given by
w˜it = w˜(rit, p, qit, λ) = w˜(p, qit, λ)+ > rit. (33)
Part a) of Proposition 10 implies that depending on the realisation of q j, and for any given
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reference wage r j, once workers become incumbent and their match productivity is revealed,
firms’ may optimally implement a wage rise, if q j is sufficiently high (> qu), a wage cut, if q j
is too low (< ql), or a wage freeze, for intermediate values of q j (∈ [ql , qu]). This characterises
the solution to the first step (31). In contrast with the deterministic environment analysed
in Section 2, the stochastic change in match productivity and the resulting (potential) wage
re-negotiation are such that incumbent workers may exert positive, negative reciprocity or
normal effort in the second employment period. These considerations influence the expected
continuation value of an employment relationship in t = s, and therefore also affect the op-
timal wage paid to newly hired workers. Although an explicit solution is not provided, as
established in part b) of Proposition 10, it can be deduced that the optimal wage paid to newly
hired workers is always perceived as a gift and will adjust smoothly to changes in p. This
characterises the solution to the second step (30).
4.3 Steady State Characterisation
The results established in the previous sections enable to characterise the steady-state equilib-
rium of the model under the additional assumptions U1-U3.
In the steady state, new hires are paid the same wage
W∗i ≡ w˜∗i ≡ w˜∗(p, qi, Q, λ)+ > r∗i
which, as it has been established, is perceived as a gift. Therefore they exert positive reciprocity
E∗i ≡ e˜∗i ≡ e˜∗(w˜∗i , r∗i )+ > e˜n
and produce output given by y(p, qi, e˜∗(w˜∗i , r
∗
i )
+). On the other hand, by the same logic ex-
plained above, incumbent workers are paid the aggregate steady-state wage
W∗j ≡W∗(r∗j , p, Q, λ) =
∫ ql(r∗j ,λ)
w˜∗(p, q j, λ)− Q(qi, dq j) +
∫ qu(r∗j )
ql(r∗j ,λ)
r∗j Q(qi, dq j)
+
∫
qu(r∗j )
w˜∗(p, q j)+ Q(qi, dq j); (34)
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and will therefore exert aggregate steady-state effort as given by
E∗j ≡ E∗(r∗j , p, Q, λ) =
∫ ql(r∗j ,λ)
e˜∗(w˜∗(p, q j, λ)−, r∗j , λ)
− Q(qi, dq j)
+
∫ qu(r∗j )
ql(r∗j ,λ)
e˜∗n Q(qi, dq j) +
∫
qu(r∗j )
e˜∗(w˜∗(p, q j)+, r∗j )
+ Q(qi, dq j); (35)
and produce aggregate output
∫
y(p, q j, e˜∗(w˜∗j , r
∗
j , λ))Q(qi, dq j).
The properties of the steady-state equilibrium under a two-period stochastic process for qt
and relatively low wage entitlements by newly hired workers can be summarised as follows.
Newly hired workers are homogenous with respect to their match productivity qi and refer-
ence wage ri. As such, they are paid the same steady-state wage, perceived as a gift, and will
exert supra-normal effort in their first employment period. Moreover, in the event of an ag-
gregate shock to productivity p, the results established in Proposition 2 enables to deduce that
new hires’ wages will be procyclical. On the other hand, incumbent workers are heterogenous
with respect to their match productivity q j, and their reference wage is determined endoge-
nously by the wage they were paid in their initial employment period. As such, as shown
by (34) and (35), a fraction of incumbent workers is paid a wage below their reference wage
and exert negative reciprocity; a fraction of incumbent workers is paid a wage gift and exert
positive reciprocity; and a fraction of incumbent workers are paid the fair wage and therefore
exert normal effort. Importantly, in contrast to new hires, there is a fraction of firms employing
incumbent workers that will optimally freeze their wage: incumbent workers may experience
downward wage rigidity.
Note that these results on wage dynamics are endogenously generated by the model, and
stem from the firms’ anticipation of their workers’ asymmetric reference-dependent reciprocity.
As such, despite the focus of the analysis that follows, the theoretical framework developed in
this paper is consistent with procyclical hiring wages and a certain degree of downward wage
rigidity in the wage of existing jobs, due to firms’ optimally anticipating the adverse effects of
wage cuts on incumbent workers’ morale and reciprocity.
To proceed with the steady-state characterisation, define the steady-state present discounted
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values of wages and output from new employment relationships as:
W∗(λ) ≡ E
[ ∞
∑
t=s
ψt−sw˜∗(r∗t , p, qt, λ)
]
≡ w˜∗(p, qi, Q, λ)+ + ψ1−ψ
∫
w˜∗(r∗j , p, q j, λ)Q(qi, dq j) (36)
Y
∗
(λ) ≡ E
[ ∞
∑
t=s
ψt−s y(p, qt, e˜∗(w˜∗t , r∗t , λ))
]
≡ y(p, qi, e˜∗(w˜∗i , r∗i )+) +ψ
∫
y(p, q j, e˜∗(w˜∗j , r
∗
j , λ)) +
ψ
1−ψ y(p, q j, e˜
∗
n)Q(qi, dq j) (37)
Hence, the expected present value to firms of new employment relationships—that is, the
profit margin, or the fundamental surplus—can be expressed asE [J(r∗i , qi))] = Y
∗
(λ)−W∗(λ).
This can then be used to determine the unique steady-state equilibrium degree of labour mar-
ket tightness θ˜∗(λ) ≡ θ˜∗(p, qi, Q, λ) and unemployment rate u∗(λ) ≡ u∗(p, qi, Q, λ), which are
characterised by the following equilibrium conditions:
κ
h(θ˜∗(λ))
= δ
[
Y
∗
(λ)−W∗(λ)
]
and ρ[1− u∗(λ)] = f (θ˜∗(λ))u∗(λ).
The remainder of the analysis builds on these results to qualitatively address the following
question: what is the effect of expected wage rigidity and anticipated negative reciprocity of
incumbent workers on the cyclical behaviour of job creation and on the volatility of vacancies
and unemployment?
4.4 Incumbents’ Downward Wage Rigidity and the Volatility of Job Creation
To proceed with the analysis, consider first the following proposition, which derives an expres-
sion for the elasticity of labour market tightness with respect to productivity characterising the
model of this section.
Proposition 11. (Irrelevance Proposition under Uncertainty). The elasticity of labour market tightness
with respect to aggregate productivity takes the form:
εθ˜∗p =
1
σ
Y
∗
(λ)
Y
∗
(λ)−W∗(λ) . (38)
As (38) shows, even in this version of the model the cyclicality of the hiring wage is irrele-
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vant for the size of εθ˜∗p .
Next notice that in the framework developed in this section (in particular due to assump-
tion U3), the loss aversion coefficient λ captures the extent of incumbent workers’ negative reci-
procity only. Therefore λ > 1 will imply downward rigidity in the wage of incumbent work-
ers in the second period of employment, once new hires have become incumbents. As such,
a comparative statics exercise with respect to λ will enable to qualitatively identify the effect
of incumbent workers’ downward wage rigidity—expected by firms at the time of hiring—on
the elasticity of labour market tightness, i.e. on the volatility of job creation.
Total differentiation of the elasticity of labour market tightness (38) with respect to λ yields
dεθ˜∗p
dλ
=
1
σ
1[
1−
[
W∗(λ)/Y∗(λ)
]]2 [
Y
∗
(λ)
]2 ·
[
dW∗(λ)
dλ
Y
∗
(λ)− dY
∗
(λ)
dλ
W∗(λ)
]
.
The sign of this expression crucially depends on the sign of the second term in square brack-
ets. Further investigation of this term yields the following (details of the derivation of this
expression are in the Proof of Proposition 13):
[
dW∗(λ)
dλ
Y
∗
(λ)− dY
∗
(λ)
dλ
W∗(λ)
]
=
w˜+i,λ
[
1 +
ψ
1−ψ
∫ qu(r∗j )
ql(r∗j ,λ)
Q(qi, dq j)
] [
Y
∗
(λ)−W∗(λ)
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
A < 0
active wage compression
+
ψ
1−ψ
∫ ql(r∗j ,λ)
w˜−j,λ Q(qi, dq j)
[
Y
∗
(λ)− (1−ψ)
∫ ql(r∗j ,λ)
y j,e e˜−j,w Q(qi, dq j)W
∗
(λ)
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
B > 0
more muted wage cuts
−ψ
∫ ql(r∗j ,λ)
y j,e e˜−j,λ Q(qi, dq j)W
∗
(λ)︸ ︷︷ ︸
C > 0
incumbents′ negative reciprocity
. (39)
Elaborated as it seems, equation (39) enables to identify precisely the effects of λ on the firms’
fundamental surplus at the time of hiring, which, as discussed, is the key component deter-
mining the size of εθ˜∗p .
In particular, there are three major effects at play, labelled here as A, B and C. Before
analysing them in detail, consider the following proposition.
Proposition 12. The steady-state wage paid to newly hired workers w˜∗(p, qi, Q, λ)+ is decreasing in
37
λ; while the steady-state wage paid to incumbent workers W∗(r∗j , p, Q, λ) is increasing in λ for all
q j < ql(r∗j , λ) given r
∗
j .
The first part of Proposition 12 establishes that the expectation by firms of downward wage
rigidity in the second employment period puts downward pressure on the wage paid to newly
hired workers (this is captured by the term w˜+i,λ < 0 in A). This effect captures the “active wage
compression” of firms in the presence of downward wage rigidity, which has been analysed in
the literature by Elsby (2009), Benigno and Ricci (2011) and Dickson and Fongoni (2016). This
result also echoes the argument emphasised by Pissarides (2009), according to which forward
looking firms may be able to internalise any potential future negative effect of wage rigidity
into the initial wage contract (see the discussion around equation (19), Pissarides (2009, p.
1350)).
The second part of Proposition 12 establishes that the expectation by firms of having to
enact a costly wage cut in the event of a low realisation of q j puts upward pressure on the
resulting optimal wage paid to incumbent workers. This result, that wage cuts are “more
muted”, derives from firms optimally offsetting their incumbent workers’ negative reciprocity
(this is captured by the term
∫ ql(r∗j ,λ) w˜−j,λ Q(qi, dq j) > 0 in B).
Forward-looking firms will anticipate the effects of these considerations on the expected
present value of the employment relationships, determining their hiring decisions. As such,
the expectation by firms of downward rigidity in the wage of incumbent workers generate the
following effects. A < 0 captures firms’ anticipation of wage compression in the wage of new
hires, which also reduces their employed workers’ wage entitlements once they will become
incumbents (as a consequence of reference wage adaptation); this effect partially increases
firms’ expected value of a match, since firms expect to pay lower hiring wages. B > 0 cap-
tures firms’ anticipation of having to set a higher wage in the second period of employment,
in order to partially offset incumbent workers’ negative reciprocity response in the event of a
wage cut; and C > 0 captures firms’ anticipation of an additional decrease in output, due to
stronger negative reciprocity by incumbent workers, in the event of a wage cut in the second
period of employment (which is captured by the term
∫ ql(r∗j ,λ) y j,e e˜−j,λ Q(qi, dq j) > 0 in C). These
two latter effects partially decrease the expected value of a new employment relationship to
firms, since they expect to pay higher wages and to endure stronger negative reciprocity in the
event of a future wage cut. Notice that this latter channel is absent in Pissarides (2009) and
in any other search and matching model developed to date, with the exception of Eliaz and
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Spiegler (2014). However, Eliaz and Spiegler (2014) focus on the incompleteness of the labour
contract, and since they implement a reduced-form production function, they are unable to
clearly identify, and unambiguously derive conclusions on, the behavioural mechanisms un-
derlying the effect of downward rigidity on the size of εθ˜∗p (see Eliaz and Spiegler (2014, p.
174)); As displayed in equation (39), the present analysis enables a transparent discussion of
the behavioural incentives underlying these mechanisms.
These considerations lead to conclude the following:
Proposition 13. The effect of incumbent workers’ negative reciprocity and downward wage rigidity on
the elasticity of labour market tightness depends on the following condition:
dεθ˜∗p
dλ
R 0⇔ |A| Q B + C.
a) If |A| < B + C, then εθ˜∗p is increasing in λ;
b) If |A| > B + C, then εθ˜∗p is decreasing in λ;
c) If |A| = B + C, then changes in λ have no effect on εθ˜∗p .
Hence, while it is difficult to qualitatively characterise the effect of λ on the volatility of
job creation, the statement of Proposition 13 establishes that: if firms expect that the effects of
negative reciprocity on output and of paying incumbent workers a higher wage are larger than
what they can offset through a compression of the hiring wage (i.e. case a)), then the expec-
tation of downward rigidity in the wage of incumbent workers will unambiguously reduce
firms’ expected present value of new employment relationships, increasing the volatility of
job creation and unemployment. On the other hand, if firms manage to sufficiently compress
hiring wages—accounting for the expected future costs of negative reciprocity and downward
wage rigidity (i.e. case b))—to the extent that the expected profit margin from new employment
relationships increases, then the volatility of job creation and unemployment will be lower. Fi-
nally, if firms expect that wage compression will be just enough to offset the negative effects
captured by B and C (i.e. case c)), then the expectation of incumbent workers’ downward wage
rigidity is irrelevant for unemployment volatility.
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5 Conclusions
Inspired by the literature on efficiency wages (Akerlof, 1982; Akerlof and Yellen, 1990) and
reciprocity in labour markets (Fehr et al., 2009), as well as by recent prominent attempts to
provide more realistic micro-foundations for the macroeconomic analysis of wage and unem-
ployment fluctuations (e.g. Snell and Thomas (2010), Danthine and Kurmann (2010) and Eliaz
and Spiegler (2014)), this paper contributes to the theory of labour market fluctuations by
studying the implications of a positive, and asymmetric, wage-effort relationship in a canon-
ical search and matching model à la Pissarides (1985, 2000). This approach allowed a novel
and in-depth analysis of the underlying behavioural incentives that determine optimal wage
setting and job creation, and shed new light on the relative importance of newly hired and
incumbent workers’ wage cyclicality for the volatility of job creation.
The contribution of this paper rests on two novel theoretical results. First, in contrast to
existing theoretical models, the analysis has shown that, by considering employed workers’
optimal effort responses to wage changes, the cyclicality of the hiring wage is irrelevant for the
size of the volatility of vacancies and unemployment. Second, after introducing uncertainty
around the evolution of a job match productivity, it has been shown that the expectation of
downward wage rigidity, and of the relatively large cost of implementing wage cuts—due to
employed (incumbent) workers’ asymmetric reference-dependent reciprocity—reduces firms’
expected surplus from new employment relationships. As such, if firms are unable to offset the
impact of these anticipated negative effects by compressing the wage of new hires, expected
downward wage rigidity will unambiguously increase the volatility of vacancies and unem-
ployment. This result complements and extends the more recent works of Eliaz and Spiegler
(2014) and Bils et al. (2016) by providing a transparent analysis of the behavioural incentives
driving firms’ optimal wage setting and job creation in long-term employment relationships.
The main behavioural mechanism underling both results is the presence of a positive, and
reference-dependent, wage-effort relationship, which stems from the optimal response of em-
ployed workers to their firms’ wage setting policy. While the existing literature on unemploy-
ment volatility seems to have so far ignored the resulting amplification mechanism implied
by this channel, the modelling approach adopted here enables a transparent analysis of its
implications.
The framework developed in this paper also highlights additional theoretical aspects that
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will benefit from further research. First, gaining insight on how wage entitlements at the start
of the employment relationship are formed, and whether firms’ information about these is
complete, can potentially enhance the understanding of the determinants of equilibrium un-
employment. For instance, it will be interesting to explore alternative, endogenous or ex-
ogenous, reference wage formation processes, and to analyse their related implications in the
context of the model developed here (the survey evidence collected under the Wage Dynam-
ics Network could be informative in this respect, see for instance Galuscak, Keeney, Nicolit-
sas, Smets, Strzelecki, and Vodopivec (2012)). Second, it could be relevant to study whether
and how workers’ wage entitlements can be systematically ‘manipulated’ downwards (for in-
stance, during recessions), either by firms, government policies or both. Doing so will not only
allow firms to produce more output at the same cost—due to an increase in morale and effort
among workers—but will also allow governments to achieve a more desirable equilibrium rate
of unemployment.
In conclusion, the approach of this paper has highlighted the existence of behavioural as-
pects characterising employment relationships—such us workers’ asymmetric effort responses
and reference wages—that can influence firms’ expected surplus from a new match, and has
provided a benchmark framework to analyse their implications that is transparent and di-
rectly comparable with the existing literature. These behavioural aspects can be exogenous to
the specific economic environment, or can be influenced by the labour market institutional and
social context. Gaining further insights in this direction can potentially contribute to enhancing
our understanding of the cyclical behaviour of labour markets.
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A Appendix: Additional Material
A.1 A Simple Calibration Exercise
This section performs a calibration exercise in order to evaluate the quantitative relevance
of the behavioural mechanisms considered in the analysis of Section 3, and to show that the
theoretical framework developed in this paper can simultaneously accommodate the empirical
volatilities of both the hiring wage and of the vacancy-unemployment ratio.
Given the relatively high number of unobservable (exogenous) parameters introduced in
this paper, the following calibration strategy and quantitative analysis will be slightly different
to the standard calibration approach in the literature. That is, instead of using debatable proxy
measures to assign values to unobservable parameters—such as employed workers’ normal
effort e˜n and the distribution of new hires’ reference wages Γ0—and to subsequently calculate
the steady-state elasticity of market tightness, the following approach will use the empirical
estimate of this volatility measure as a calibration target. More precisely, the analysis will study
a combination of the behavioural parameters that can deliver plausible empirical elasticities
of both the hiring wage and the vacancy-unemployment ratio with respect to productivity
shocks.
A.1.1 A model for calibration
This section presents a parameterised version of the model which enables to characterise closed-
form explicit solutions suitable for calibration. As such, consistent with Assumptions A3, F1
and W1–W3 of Section 2, consider the following functional forms: matching function m¯(u, v) =
mˆuσv1−σ ; firms’ per-worker output y(p, e) = pe; workers’ utility from the wage m(w) = log w;
and their net cost of productive activity c(e) = e2/2− be, with b > 0. To reduce the number of
exogenous parameters, the importance of gain-loss utility for workers is set to unity, η = 1. Fi-
nally, the state space characterising the distribution of new hires’ reference wages is discretised
as follows:
C1. ri is the realisation of a random variable on the state spaceRi = {rl , rm, rh},Ri ⊂ R, where
rl < rL(p), rm ∈ [rL, rH], rh > rH(p, λ); and it is distributed according to γ0 : Ri → R
with γ0(ri) ≥ 0 for all ri ∈ Ri, and ∑ri∈Ri γ0(ri) = 1.
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Hence, the labour market is populated by a fraction γ0(rl) of workers with relatively ‘low’
reference wages; a fraction γ0(rm) of workers with relatively ‘moderate’ reference wages; and
a fraction γ0(rh) of workers with relatively ‘high’ reference wages.31
Given these assumptions, the workers’ asymmetric reference-dependent reciprocity e˜ =
e˜(w, r, λ) and the corresponding firms’ optimal wage policy w˜ = w˜(r, p, λ) take the following
simple forms:
e˜ =

e˜n + [log w− log r] if w > r
e˜n if w = r
e˜n − λ[log r− log w] if w < r
and w˜ =

p[1−ψ] if r < rL(p)
r if r ∈ [rL, rH]
λp[1−ψ] if r > rH(p, λ);
where e˜n ≡ b; and rL(p) = p(1−ψ) and rH(p, λ) = λp(1−ψ).
These results are sufficient to derive explicit steady-state solutions following the results
established in Sections 2 and 3. For clarity of exposition it useful to show the expression char-
acterising the expected present discounted values of output and wages
Y
∗
(E∗) = p
[
∑
ri∈Ri
γ0(ri)e˜(w˜∗, r∗i , λ) +
ψ
1−ψ e˜n
]
and W∗ = ∑
ri∈Ri
γ0(ri)
w˜(r∗i , p, λ)
1−ψ
respectively; which are relevant for the analytical expression of the elasticity of labour market
tightness derived in Proposition 8.
Finally, denote the expected average elasticity of the hiring wage by
εW∗p ≡ ∑
ri∈Ri
γ0(ri)εw˜∗p ;
and notice that due to the assumption that m(w) = log w, the elasticity of the hiring wage
with respect to productivity is εw˜∗p = 1 for all r
∗
i = {rl , rh}; and indeed εw˜∗p = 0 for all r∗i = rm.
As such it is possible to deduce that the maximum value of εW∗p that can be achieved using
this model is bounded above by 1; which can be obtained by any calibration using a reference
wage distribution (γ0(r∗i ))r∗i ∈Ri ≡ (γ0(rl),γ0(rm),γ0(rh)) in which γ0(rm) = 0. An alterna-
tive assumption for the utility of the wage consistent with Assumption W1 would have been
m(w) = wα/α with α ∈ (0, 1). In such a case, it can be shown that the maximum value of εW∗p
31Note that Assumption C1 concerns all workers that can potentially become new hires in the period in which
firms post vacancies, and not only those new hires that are successfully matched in their first period of produc-
tion. Moreover notice that ∑ri∈Ri γ0(ri)ri represents both the average and the expected reference wage characterising
potential new hires in the labour market.
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that can be achieved by the model is bounded above by the factor 11−α , which is greater than
1 for anyα ∈ (0, 1). Since this alternative formulation introduces an additional, unobservable
parameter that will have to be calibrated, the analysis that follows will implement the natural
logarithm instead.
A.1.2 Calibration strategy
The calibration proceeds as follows: first the conventional parameters of the model are chosen
in accordance with the standard approach in the literature; then, the remaining behavioural
parameters are calibrated so as to achieve a target elasticity of labour market tightness of εθ˜∗p =
7.56 and target average elasticity of hiring wages of εW∗p = 0.8 (see Haefke et al. (2013)). To
enhance comparability with the literature, conventional parameters and targets are chosen
following the calibration performed by Pissarides (2009).
Conventional parameters. The time period is given by a quarter. The elasticity of the match-
ing function with respect to unemployment σ is set equal to 0.5 as in Pissarides (2009). This
value is at the lower bound of the range of estimates provided by Petrongolo and Pissarides
(2001), i.e. σ ∈ [0.5, 0.7], and it is in the middle of the range of values used in the literature, i.e.
σ ∈ [0.235, 0.72] (see Kudlyak (2014)). The discount factor δ = 0.996 is set to match a quar-
terly interest rate of 0.004, and the exogenous job destruction rate ρ is set equal to 0.036 (see
Pissarides (2009) and Shimer (2012)). The aggregate match productivity parameter p is nor-
malised to 100 in order to ensure a non-negative wage utility, i.e. so that m(w˜∗) = log w˜∗ ≥ 0.
The remaining conventional parameters—namely, the efficiency of matching mˆ and the cost
of posting a vacancy κ—are calibrated to match an average job finding probability of 0.594,
and an average vacancy-unemployment ratio of 0.72 (as in Pissarides (2009)).32 Notice that
this calibration yields a steady-state probability that a vacant job is matched with a worker of
h(θ) = 0.7 · (0.72)−0.5 = 0.825.
Behavioural parameters. The behavioural parameters of the model are: the employed work-
ers’ normal effort e˜n; their degree of loss aversion λ, which also affects their extent of negative
reciprocity in the event of an unfair wage; their wage entitlements at the start of the employ-
ment relationship r∗i = {rl , rm, rh}; and the vector of relative frequencies (γ0(r∗i ))r∗i ∈Ri with
which these entitlements are distributed among workers.
32The relatively high number which results from the calibration of the vacancy cost κ is essentially a product of
the non-conventional normalisation of the match productivity p. However note that none of these two parameters
are crucial for the determination of the elasticity of market tightness.
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The loss aversion parameter λ is set to be equal to 2, which implies that the negative ef-
fect of an unfair wage is two times bigger than the positive effect of a wage gift on workers’
morale and reciprocity. This parameter value is based on the experimental analysis of Abdel-
laoui, Bleichrodt, and Paraschiv (2007) and lies below the median of the range of loss aversion
parameters λ ∈ [1.43, 4.8] estimated in the literature (see Abdellaoui et al. (2007) for a review).
Table 1: Parameter Values, Quarterly Calibration
Parameter Value Description Source/Reason
Conventional
σ 0.500 Elasticity of matching Literature
ρ 0.036 Exogenous job destruction Rate Literature
δ 0.996 Discount factor Interest rate = 0.004
mˆ 0.700 Efficiency of matching Job finding probability
κ 45.00 Vacancy cost v/u ratio
Behavioural
λ 2.000 Loss aversion parameter Abdellaoui et al. (2007)
e˜n 0.082 Normal effort 1% above en
|w˜∗ − r∗i |/r∗i 5% w–r % deviation ∀r∗i = {rl , rh} See Below
(γ0(r∗i ))r∗i ∈Ri (0.39, 0.20, 0.41) New hires’ reference wage distribution Calibrated
Normalisations
p 100.0 Aggregate productivity log w˜∗ > 0
Targets
θ 0.720 Average v/u (tightness) Pissarides (2009)
m¯θ1−σ 0.594 Average job finding probability Pissarides (2009)
εθ˜∗p 7.560 Average elasticity of θ w.r.t. p Literature
εW∗p 0.800 Average elasticity of w w.r.t. p Haefke et al. (2013)
At this stage notice that it is possible to find several combinations of the remaining be-
havioural parameters that could deliver the two target elasticities of market tightness 7.56
and hiring wages 0.8. This is because the number of unknown parameters is greater than the
number of target equations. While this issue could be criticised to be unsatisfactory from a
purely quantitative perspective, it also shows that there exists a richer set of potential chan-
nels through which the volatility of vacancies and unemployment could be amplified that are
consistent with empirical estimates of new hires’ wage cyclicality. Nevertheless, it is possi-
ble to proceed with the calibration by implementing plausible conditions to pin down these
parameters.
Workers’ normal effort e˜n—which, as established in Section 2, captures the level of effort
that minimises the net cost from productive activity whenever a worker is paid their reference
wage—is set to be 1% above the minimum effort required to ensure that firms’ zero-profit con-
dition when hiring a worker with a relatively high reference wage r∗i = r
h is always satisfied
That is, e˜n = en(rh, λ) · [1 + 1%] where en(rh, λ) ≡ max{e˜n : J(rh) = 0}. Hence en(rh, λ) is
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endogenous to the calibration since it depends on the value of rh, which is unknown. For the
baseline calibration, the level of new hires’ reference wages are calibrated by simultaneously
setting the following conditions: i) the percentage deviations of the relatively low and rela-
tively high reference wages from their respective steady-state wages are assumed to be the
same in absolute magnitude, and in particular:33
|w˜∗(p)+ − rl |
rl
=
|w˜∗(p, λ)− − rh|
rh
= 5%;
and ii) the relatively moderate reference wage is assumed to be the average of the high and
low reference wage:
rm =
rl + rh
2
.
These conditions yield Ri = {rl , rm, rh} = {3.8, 6.1, 8.4} and a value for normal effort of e˜n ≈
0.081 + 0.001 ≈ 0.082.
Using these values it is now possible to calibrate the frequencies of new hires’ reference
wages in the market to deliver an elasticity of labour market tightness of 7.56 and an average
elasticity of the hiring wage of 0.8. These are pinned down by the following conditions:
γ0(rl) = {γ0(rl) : ∑
ri∈Ri
γ0(ri) = 1}; (40)
γ0(rm) = {γ0(rm) : ∑
ri∈Ri
γ0(ri)εw˜∗p = 0.8}; (41)
γ0(rh) = {γ0(rh) : εθ˜∗p = 7.56}; (42)
which yields (γ0(r∗i ))r∗i ∈Ri = (0.394, 0.200, 0.406). Hence, firms face a probability of h(θ) ·
γ0(rl) = 0.825 · 0.394 ≈ 0.325 of being matched with a worker for which it is optimal to pay
a wage 5% above their reference wage; a probability of h(θ) ·γ0(rh) = 0.825 · 0.406 ≈ 0.165 of
being matched with a worker for which it is optimal to pay a wage 5% below their reference
wage; and a probability of h(θ) · γ0(rm) = 0.825 · 0.200 ≈ 0.335 of being matched with a
worker for which it is optimal or to pay them their reference wage.
33Notice that although this number has been chosen arbitrarily, the calibration remains robust to choices ranging
from 1% to 60%. This is because parameters such as e˜n or (γ0(r∗i ))r∗i ∈Ri are endogenous to the calibration and will
adjust accordingly to deliver the required target elasticities of wages and market tightness.
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A.1.3 Calibration results and discussion
The calibration results of interest are reported in Tables 2 and 3. The first three rows of each ta-
ble display the results for a representative worker-firm employment relationship in which the
employed worker is characterised by a relatively low, moderate or high reference wage respec-
tively. The last row displays the expected labour market values of the endogenous outcomes
in the steady state.
As shown in Table 2, 39% of new hires are characterised by a relatively low reference wage
rl ≈ 3.8 and are paid the steady-state equilibrium wage w˜+ ≈ 4.0. This is perceived as a
wage gift of 5%, which triggers an endogenous positive reciprocity response of +25.8% in the
first employment period, calculated as the percentage deviation of new hires’ supra-normal
effort e˜+ ≈ 0.103 from their normal level e˜n = 0.082. On the contrary, 40.6% of new hires are
characterised by a relatively high reference wage rh ≈ 8.4 and are paid the steady-state equi-
librium wage w˜− ≈ 8.0, which however is perceived as unfair. In fact, this wage is 5% below
their wage entitlement and therefore triggers an endogenous negative reciprocity response of
−54.2%, corresponding to sub-normal effort e˜− ≈ 0.038. Finally, 20% of new hires are paid
their reference wage w˜= = rm ≈ 6.1 and therefore exert normal effort e˜n = 0.082 in their first
period of employment. These results imply that firms expect to pay new hires a wage that
Table 2: Newly Hired Workers Statistics
Steady State Outcomes
γ0(r∗i ) W
∗ as % of y R∗i w-r gap E
∗
i % deviation from e˜n
Low 0.394 4.0 38.5% 3.8 +5% 0.103 +25.8%
Moderate 0.200 6.1 74.0% 6.1 - 0.082 -
High 0.406 8.0 211.3% 8.4 −5% 0.038 −54.2%
Expected 6.02 83.0% 6.12 -1.56% 0.073 −11.8%
is just −1.56% below the average reference wage in the labour market, but that generates an
expected negative reciprocity response of −11.8% in the first employment period.
Table 3 displays the present discounted values of output and wages in the market, the
resulting value of a new employment relationship to firms, and related elasticities of new hires’
wages and market tightness. From these results it is clear that the expected value of a job filled
by a newly hired worker with a high reference wage is very low relative to the one filled by a
worker with either a low or a moderate reference wage. The main drivers of this outcome are:
the relatively low normal effort—which is 1% above the minimum required for the job to be
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profitable; combined with the outcome of optimal wage setting—according to which firms pay
a relatively higher (here twice as high) steady-state wage in order to offset the greater cost of
new hires’ negative reciprocity in the first employment period. Nevertheless, in expectation,
the value of a new employment relationship is ‘reasonably’ large and consistent with a steady-
state elasticity of labour market tightness of 7.56 as required.
Table 3: Present Values and Elasticities
Steady State Outcomes
γ0(r∗i ) Y
∗
(E∗) W∗ E[J(r∗i )] εW∗p εθ˜∗p
Low 0.394 208.6 100.0 108.6 1.00 3.841
Moderate 0.200 206.5 152.9 53.62 0.00 7.703
High 0.406 202.0 200.0 2.045 1.00 197.6
Expected 205.5 151.2 51.26 0.800 7.560
To conclude, although tackling the unemployment volatility puzzle from an alternative,
un-conventional, perspective, the analysis of this section has been useful to show that for plau-
sible values of the behavioural parameters introduced in this paper, the present framework
can simultaneously accommodate the empirical volatilities of both the hiring wage and of the
vacancy-unemployment ratio, overcoming one of the issues mentioned by Kudlyak (2014).
This result enhances the quantitative relevance of the behavioural aspects considered, and
suggests a promising route for a richer dynamic stochastic simulation of the model.
A.2 Workers’ Reservation Wage Condition
From reference wage adaptation (Assumption A2) and the results established in Theorem 1
and Proposition 2, the value of employment to an incumbent worker, given by (12), can be
rearranged as
W(w˜(ri), w˜(ri)) = u(e˜n, w˜(ri), w˜(ri)) + δρU1−ψ ;
since r jt = w˜t−1 and w˜t+1 = w˜t = w˜t−1 = w˜(ri) (omitting the other functional arguments).
Using this expression, the value of employment to a new hire, given by (13), can be rewritten
as
W(w˜(ri), ri) = u(e˜(w˜(ri), ri, λ), w˜(ri), ri) + ψ1−ψu(e˜n, w˜(ri), w˜(ri)) +
δρ
1−ψU .
Notice that the first two terms on the right-hand side together represent the present discounted
value of utility of being employed at the wage w˜(ri) from t = s onwards, conditional on the
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exogenous job destruction rate. As such, to ease notation, define:
u(e˜n, w˜(ri), ri) = u(e˜(w˜(ri), ri, λ), w˜(ri), ri) +
ψ
1−ψu(e˜n, w˜(ri), w˜(ri)),
and re-write the value of employment to a new hire as
W(w˜(ri), ri) = u(e˜n, w˜(ri), ri) + δρ1−ψU . (43)
Finally, the value of unemployment, given by (14), can be rearranged as
U = u(z) + δ f (θt)E [W(w˜(ri), ri)]
1− δ[1− f (θt)] . (44)
Using the definition of the reservation wage wi ≡ {w : W(w, ri) = U}, by substituting wi
into (43), and collecting U as the common factor yields:
u(e˜n, wi, ri) = U
1− δ
1−ψ (45)
[Notice that this is the analog of the one derived by Pissarides 2000, p.150, equation (6.14)].
To write an expression in terms of wages, take the expected value of (43), substitute it into
(44), and then rearrange the equation, solving for U :
U = u(z)1−ψ
ψ˘(θt)
+E [u(e˜n, w˜(ri), ri)]
δ f (θt)[1−ψ]
ψ˘(θt)
;
where ψ˘(θt) ≡ (1 − δ)[1 −ψ + δ f (θt)]. By using this expression to substitute U out of (45),
and after some algebra, it is possible to establish that a worker’s reservation wage is implicitly
characterised by the following expression:
u(e˜n, wi, ri) =
u(z) + δ f (θt)E [u(e˜n, w˜(ri), ri)]
1−ψ+ δ f (θt) ; (46)
which is equivalent to (15) in the main body of the paper. [Notice that this is the analog of the
one derived in Pissarides 2000, p. 150, eq. (6.15)].
Finally, by using the model and results established in the calibration exercise of Section A.1,
it is possible to show that, for conventional values of unemployment income z, the workers’
reservation wage condition is also always satisfied, that is w˜i(ri) ≥ wi for all ri ∈ Ri. This is
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done by showing that the following condition always holds
u(e˜n, w˜∗, r∗i ) ≥
u(z) + δ f (θ) ∑
ri∈Ri
γ0(ri)u(e˜n, w˜∗, r∗i )
1−ψ+ δ f (θ) ; (47)
which is the steady-state equivalent of condition (15) of Section 2.4 where u(z) = log(z) and as
in the baseline calibration Ri = {rl , rm, rh} = {3.8, 6.1, 8.4}. Notice that while the right-hand
side (RHS) of (47) depends on the distribution of r∗i , the left-hand side (LHS) depends on the
actual level of r∗i which can be either ‘low’, ‘moderate’, or ‘high’.
Let unemployment income z be 40% of the expected wage in the market ∑ri∈Ri γ0(ri)w˜
∗ (as
in Shimer (2005) and Hall (2005b)), that is z = 6.02 · 40/100 = 2.41. Using the results obtained
from the calibration performed in Section A.1, in equation (47) the RHS = 19.10 is always
lower than the LHS = {19.62, 19.78, 19.85} for any r∗i = {3.8, 6.1, 8.4}. As such, whenever a
worker is matched with a firm an receives a wage offer w˜∗, the present discounted value of
utility from accepting the job and being employed at w˜∗ is always greater than the expected
discounted value of utility from continuing searching, being paid unemployment income z
and facing the probability f (θ) of being matched with a firm in the following period.
B Appendix: Proofs
Proof of Theorem 1. Denote the first-order condition characterising the worker’s optimal
effort by Ω(e; w, r, λ). Assumptions W1-W3 hold throughout. First notice that when w < r,
the wage offered may be such that the worker would optimally choose e < 0 but cannot due
to the constraint that e ≥ 0. Define
w˜(r, λ) = max{0, w : Ω(0; w, r, λ) = 0}.
Since Ωw(e, w, r, λ) = µ′(m(w)−m(r))m′(w) > 0 this identifies the threshold wage at which
the worker would choose e = 0 and below which they would optimally choose e < 0 (since
Ω(e; w, r, λ) < 0 for all e ≥ 0) but cannot; hence define e˜(w˜(r, λ), r, λ)− ≡ 0 for all w ≤ w˜(r, λ).
So long as w > w˜(r, λ) optimal effort is given by the inverse function
e˜(w, r, λ) = c′−1(µ(m(w)−m(r)))
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which exists since c′ is strictly monotonic. Moreover, since c′ is a continuous function and µ
varies continuously in w and r, e˜(w, r, λ) will be a continuous function of w and r, but it will
not be continuously differentiable everywhere as µ has a kink at w = r.
When w = r, m(w) = m(r) and therefore Ω(e; r, r, λ) = −c′(e). By assumption W2,
Ω(0; r, r, λ) = −c′(0) > 0 and Ωe(e, w, r, λ) = −c′′(e) < 0 which implies e˜(r, r, λ) = c′−1(0) ≡
e˜n > 0. Recalling the definition of µ in (4), when w > r, e˜(r, r, λ) = c′−1(η[m(w)−m(r)]) > e˜n
since m(w) − m(r) > 0; whilst when w < r, e˜(r, r, λ) = c′−1(λη[m(w) − m(r)]) < e˜n since
m(w)−m(r) < 0. As such lim→0 m(r +)−m(r) = 0 implies e˜(w, r)+ → e˜n as w → r from
above, and lim→0 m(r−)−m(r) = 0 implies e˜(w, r, λ)− → e˜n as w→ r from below.
When w 6= r and w > w˜(r, λ) implicit differentiation of the first-order condition reveals
e˜w(w, r, λ) = −Ωw
Ωe
=
µ′(m(w)−m(r))m′(w)
c′′(e)
> 0.
Further differentiating this expression (and recalling that µ is piecewise linear, by Assumption
W3, and that c′′′(e) = 0, by Assumption W2) yields:
e˜ww(w, r, λ) =
µ′(m(w)−m(r))m′′(w)
c′′(e)
< 0.
e˜wr(w, r, λ) = −µ
′′(m(w)−m(r))m′(w)m′(r)
c′′(e)
= 0.
Note from (4) that for w > r, µ′(x) = η and when w < r, µ′(x) = λη. To consider the
response of effort to the wage above and below the reference wage, the continuity of e˜(w, r, λ)
is used to establish that
lim
→0
e˜w(r−, r, λ)− = − lim
→0
λ · ηm′(r−)
b′′(e˜(r−, r, λ)−)− c′′(e˜(r−, r, λ)−)
= − λ · ηm
′(r)
b′′(e˜n)− c′′(e˜n)
= − lim
→0
λ · ηm′(r +)
b′′(e˜(r +, r)+)− c′′(e˜(r +, r)+)
= λ · lim
→0
e˜w(r +, r)+.
Since this implies the effort function kinks to a flatter slope as the wage increases, this result
combined with the deduction that e˜ww < 0 for all w 6= r, implies e˜w is everywhere decreasing
in w, i.e. the effort function is concave onW .
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The relationship between e˜(w, r, λ) and r is established by implicit differentiation:
e˜r(w, r, λ) = −Ωr
Ωe
=
µ′(m(w)−m(r))m′(r)
c′′(e)
< 0.
Similarly, the effect of the degree of loss aversion on effort when w < r is
e˜λ(w, r, λ)− = −Ωλ
Ωe
=
η[m(w)−m(r)]
c′′(e)
< 0.
Moreover, the effect of λ on e˜(w, r, λ) (for w < r) is
e˜wλ(w, r, λ)− =
ηm′(w)
c′′(e)
> 0.

Proof of Proposition 1. First, consider the following Lemmata (the prime that is not fol-
lowed by functional arguments denotes forward values):
Lemma 3. ye(p, e˜) = ye(p, e˜′)
Proof.From assumption F1, yee = 0 which implies that ye(p, e˜) is independent of e˜; and
since p is parametric and time invariant, it follows that ye(p, e˜) = ye(p, e˜′). 
Lemma 4. e˜r(w′, r′, λ) = −e˜w(w, r, λ) if r′ = w
Proof.Part b) of Theorem 1 establishes that e˜wr = 0. This implies that e˜r(w′, r′, λ) is indepen-
dent of its first argument w′. and that e˜w(w, r, λ) is independent of its second argument r. Then,
since r′ = w, from the properties of µ it is possible to deduce that µ′(x)m′(r′) = −µ′(x)m′(w),
which implies that e˜r(w′, r′, λ) = −e˜w(w, r, λ). 
As such, the first-order condition (8) can be expressed as:
Υ(w; r, p, λ) ≡ ye e˜w − 1 +ψy′e e˜′r
= ye e˜w − 1−ψye e˜w
= ye e˜w[1−ψ]− 1 (48)
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where the second line follows from the results established in Lemma 3 and 4. It follows that
Υw(w; r, p, λ) = ye e˜ww[1−ψ] < 0
for all w 6= r. This implies that Υ(w; r, p, λ) is everywhere decreasing in w, establishing con-
cavity of the firm’s value function J. This also makes the first-order condition (8) sufficient for
the characterisation of a global maximum. 
Proof of Proposition 2. This proof proceeds as follows. First it will be shown that under
assumptions W1-W3, F1, A2 and one additional, though innocuous, restriction on the state
and control spaces there exists a unique solution to the functional equation (7). Then, the proof
will characterise the properties of the firm’s optimal wage policy, following the steps used in
the proof of Theorem 2, Dickson and Fongoni (2016).
Preliminaries. By definition, the state and control space R andW are both convex subsets
of R+. Throughout the proof it is assumed thatW = R = [0, r¯], where r¯ is sufficiently large, in
the sense that all the solutions to the firm’s maximisation problem are interior (in particular r¯ >
rH(p, λ), as defined in the statement of the proposition). Notice that since pi(w, r) is increasing
and strictly concave in w and decreasing in r, it is possible to characterise r¯ such that it never
binds. Moreover notice that since the firm may want to set the wage wt either above, equal, or
below the worker’s reference wage rt in each period t, the values of w that are allowed for any
given r is independent of the actual level of r. As such, the set of feasible controls in each t is
given byW , which is nonempty, convex and compact.
Given these premises, it is possible to establish that the instantaneous profit function pi(w, r)
is both bounded and continuous in its domain. This, together with the fact thatψ ∈ (0, 1), im-
plies that the operator T defined as
(TJ)(r) ≡ max
w∈W
{pi(r, w) +ψJ(w)} ,
which maps the space of continuous and bounded functions into itself, is a contraction with a
unique fixed point. Hence there exists a unique solution to the functional equation given by
(7); and at least one optimal wage policy exists (see, for instance, Theorem 4.6, p.79 of Stokey
and Lucas (1989)).
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Hence, the first-order necessary condition to characterise an optimum is
piw(r, w) +ψJ′(w) = 0.
The related envelope condition is
J′(r) = pir(w, r).
Combining these two conditions, and denoting the firm’s optimal wage policy by w˜ = w˜(r),
yields the following Euler equation
piw(r, w˜(r)) +ψpir(w˜(w˜(r)), w˜(r)) = 0.
Since pi is strictly concave in w, andW is a convex set, to establish uniqueness of the optimal
wage policy w˜(r) it remains to be shown that the firm’s value function J is concave (which is
not trivial since pi is decreasing and convex in r). This is established in Proposition 1, implying
that the first-order condition (8) is sufficient for the characterisation of a global maximum. In
addition notice that
Υλ(w; r, p, λ) = ye e˜wλ +ψy′e e˜′rλ > 0 if w < r;
Υλ(w; r, p, λ) = ye e˜wλ +ψy′e e˜′rλ = 0 if w > r.
These results enable to deduce that if λ > 1, Υ(w; r, p, λ) jumps down at the reference wage.
Hence it is now possible to proceed with the proof following the same approach implemented
in the proof of Theorem 2, Dickson and Fongoni (2016).
Reference wage thresholds. The threshold rL(p) is the level of a worker’s reference wage
below which a firm would optimally set a wage above their reference wage, and rH(p, λ) is the
level of a worker’s reference wage above which a firm would optimally pay the worker a wage
below their reference wage. The former, rL(p), is the value of r below which the value function
J is increasing just above the reference wage; the latter, rH(p, λ), is the value of r above which the
value function J is decreasing just below the reference wage. These thresholds can be characterised
respectively by
lim
→0
Υ(r +; r, p, λ) = ye lim
→0
e˜w(r +, r)+[1−ψ]− 1 = 0
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and
lim
→0
Υ(r−; r, p, λ) = ye lim
→0
e˜w(r−, r, λ)−[1−ψ]− 1 = 0
Using the result established in Theorem 1, part a):
lim
→0
Υ(r−; r, p, λ)− lim
→0
Υ(r +; r, p, λ) =
= ye lim
→0
e˜w(r−, r, λ)−[1−ψ]− 1− ye lim
→0
e˜w(r +, r)+[1−ψ] + 1
= yeλ lim
→0
e˜(r +, r)+[1−ψ]− ye lim
→0
e˜w(r +, r)+[1−ψ]
= ye lim
→0
e˜w(r +, r)+[1−ψ][λ− 1] ≥ 0
with a strict inequality if λ > 1. Hence, rH(p, λ) is increasing in λ; rH(p, λ) > rL(p) for all
λ > 1; and rH(p, 1) = rL(p).
Optimal wage setting policy. Consider now the optimal wage setting policy, which depends
on the level employed workers’ reference wages r in relation to the reference wage thresholds
derived above.
If r ∈ [rH(p, λ), r¯], then from the definition of rH(p, λ), which implies that J is decreasing
just below the reference wage, and since Υw < 0, which implies strict concavity of J onW , it is
possible to deduce that the optimal wage policy must satisfy w < r, and will therefore be the
solution to
ye(p, e˜)e˜w(w, r, λ)− − 1 +ψye(p, e˜′)e˜r(w′, w, λ)− = 0 (49)
which is denoted by w˜(p, λ)− (recalling that the expression above is independent of e˜, r and w′
as established in Lemma 3 and 4).
Analogously, if r ∈ [0, rL(p)], then from the definition of rL(p), which implies that J is
increasing just above the reference wage, and since J is strictly concave onW , it is possible to
deduce that the optimal wage must satisfy w > r, and will therefore be the solution to
ye(p, e˜)e˜w(w, r)+ − 1 +ψye(p, e˜′)e˜r(w′, w)+ = 0 (50)
which is denoted by w˜(p)+ (the expression above being independent of e˜′, r and w′). Since
Υλ > 0 it is straightforward to show that w˜(p, λ)− > w˜(p)+, and that if λ = 1 then w˜(p, 1)− =
w˜(p)+.
Finally, if r ∈ [rL, rH], from the definition of the reference wage thresholds and the concavity
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of the firm’s value function, it is possible to deduce that Υ(w; r, p, λ) < 0 for all w > r and that
Υ(w; r, p, λ) > 0 for all w < r. Hence J(r) is maximised if and only if the optimal wage policy
is w = r.
As such it is straightforward to show that for all rt ∈ R \ [rL, rH], w˜ is independent of r as
noted above and that
w˜p(r, p, λ) = −Υp
Υw
= − yep[1−ψ]
ye e˜ww[1−ψ] > 0
which implies that w˜ is increasing in p. Moreover, since w˜ = r for all r ∈ [rL, rH], it is straight-
forward to see that w˜ is increasing in r and independent of p. Finally, for all r ∈ [rH , r¯], implicit
differentiation yields:
w˜λ(r, p, λ) = −Υλ
Υw
= − ye e˜wλ[1−ψ]
ye e˜ww[1−ψ] > 0
since e˜wλ > 0 as established by Theorem 1, which implies that w˜(p, λ)− is increasing in λ. 
Proof of Proposition 3. Consider the employed workers’ {i, j} reference wage rt, which
evolves according to A2.
New Hires. First of all notice that since γ0 is given and time-invariant, for all t, any rit ∼
Γ0 characterises the steady-state reference wage of newly hired workers, and it is denoted
by r∗i . Hence, the steady-state aggregate reference wage of new hires is given by R
∗
i (Γ0) =∫ r¯
0 r0 dΓ0(ri) =
∫ r¯
0 r
∗
i dΓ0(ri); As such, following the results established in Theorem 1 and Propo-
sition 2, it is possible to deduce the following. For all r∗i ∈ [0, rL) the steady-state optimal
wage paid to new hires is w˜∗(r∗i , p, λ) = w˜
∗(p)+. and their steady-state optimal effort is
e˜∗(w˜∗, r∗, λ) = e˜∗(w˜∗(p)+, r∗i )
+. For all r∗i ∈ (rH , r¯] the steady-state optimal wage paid to
new hires is w˜∗(r∗i , p, λ) = w˜
∗(p, λ)−. and their steady-state optimal effort is e˜∗(w˜∗, r∗, λ) =
e˜∗(w˜∗(p, λ)−, r∗i , λ)
−. Finally, for all r∗i ∈ [rL, rH], the steady-state optimal wage paid to new
hires is w˜∗(r∗i , p, λ) = r
∗
i which implies that optimal effort is e˜
∗(w˜∗, r∗, λ) = e˜∗(r∗s , r∗i , λ) = e˜
∗
n.
Incumbents. Any r∗j that satisfies r
∗
j = w˜(r
∗
j , p, λ) is a steady state. First, notice that for all
r0 ∈ [rL, rH], any r0 is already a steady state since, according to the firms’ optimal wage policy
as established by Proposition 2, w˜(r0, p, λ) = r0. As such, from the results of Theorem 1, for all
r∗j ∈ [rL, rH], the steady-state optimal wage paid to new hires is w˜∗(r∗j , p, λ) = r∗j (= r∗i ), which
implies that their optimal effort is e˜(r∗i , r
∗
i , λ) = e˜
∗
n.
Next consider the case of r0 ∈ [0, r¯] \ [rL, rH]. Existence and uniqueness are straightforward
to verify given the results established by Proposition 2. In fact, for all r0 ∈ [0, r¯] \ [rL, rH]
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the optimal wage policy is independent of r0 and characterises the steady-sate wage paid to
incumbents as w˜∗(r0, p, λ) = w˜∗(p)+ if r0 ∈ [0, rL); and as w˜∗(r0, p, λ) = w˜∗(p, λ)− if r0 ∈
(rH , r¯]. As such, from A2 it follows that there exist a unique r∗j = w˜
∗(p)+ for all r0 ∈ [0, rL),
and a unique r∗j = w˜
∗(p, λ)− for all r0 ∈ (rH , r¯]. These hold for all t > 0. Moreover, it is
possible to verify that
lim
→0
Υ(r +; r, p, λ) = Υ(w; r, p, λ)
∣∣∣
w˜∗(p)+=r∗
∀w > r;
lim
→0
Υ(r−; r, p, λ) = Υ(w; r, p, λ)
∣∣∣
w˜∗(p,λ)−=r∗
∀w < r.
This implies that for all r0 ∈ [0, rL), r∗j = rL(p); and that for all r0 ∈ (rH , r¯], r∗j = rH(p, λ).
As such, for all r0 ∈ [0, rL) the steady-state reference wage of incumbents is given by r∗j =
w˜∗(r0, p, λ), i.e. by r∗L(p) = w˜
∗(p)+; while for all r0 ∈ (rH , r¯] it is given by r∗j = w˜∗(r0, p, λ), i.e.
by r∗H(p, λ) = w˜
∗(p, λ)−. These results establish that for any given r0 ∈ [0, r¯], and for all t > 0,
w˜∗ = r∗j which implies that the steady-state optimal effort exerted by incumbents is given by
e˜(w˜∗, r∗, λ) = e˜(r∗j , r
∗
j , λ) = e˜
∗
n. 
Proof of Lemma 2. Following the definitions provided in the text and the results estab-
lished by Proposition 3, the steady-state values of an employment relationship with an incum-
bent worker can be expressed as
J(r∗j )
+ =
y(p, e˜∗n)− w˜∗(p)+
1−ψ if ri < rL(p);
J(r∗j )
= =
y(p, e˜∗n)− r∗i
1−ψ if ri ∈ [rL, rH];
J(r∗j )
− =
y(p, e˜∗n)− w˜∗(p, λ)−
1−ψ if ri > rH(p, λ).
The corresponding steady-state values of an employment relationship with a new hire can
therefore be expressed as
J(r∗i )
+ = y(p, e˜∗(w˜∗(p)+, r∗i )
+) +
ψ
1−ψ y(p, e˜
∗
n)−
w˜∗(p)+
1−ψ if ri < rL(p);
J(r∗i )
= =
y(p, e˜∗n)− r∗i
1−ψ if ri ∈ [rL, rH];
J(r∗i )
− = y(p, e˜∗(w˜∗(p, λ)−, r∗i , λ)
−) +
ψ
1−ψ y(p, e˜
∗
n)−
w˜∗(p, λ)−
1−ψ if ri > rH(p, λ).
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From these expressions it is now straightforward to conclude that J(r∗i )
+ > J(r∗i )
= > J(r∗i )
−,
since at the optimum J(r∗i ) is increasing in e˜
∗, and e˜∗(w˜∗(p)+, r∗i )
+ > e˜∗n > e˜∗(w˜∗(p, λ)−, r∗i , λ)
−.
Moreover, the same argument can be used to show that J(r∗i )
+ > J(r∗j )
+, J(r∗i )
= = J(r∗j )
=, and
that J(r∗i )
− < J(r∗j )
−. 
Proof of Proposition 5. Using the results established in Proposition 2 it is straightforward
to show that
dW∗(Γ0, p, λ)
dp
=
∫ rL(p)
0
w˜∗p(p)+ dΓ0(ri) +
∫ r¯
rH(p,λ)
w˜∗p(p, λ)− dΓ0(ri) > 0,
where the derivatives of the limits of the integral with respect to p cancel each other out
since w˜ is continuous in p. Moreover since R∗j (Γ0, p, λ) = W
∗(Γ0, p, λ) it can be deduced that
R∗j (Γ0, p, λ) is also increasing in p. This, together with the results established in Theorem 1,
enables to deduce that
dE∗i (Γ0, p, λ)
dp
=
∫ rL(p)
0
e˜∗w(w˜∗(p)+, r∗i )
+w˜∗p(p)+ dΓ0(ri)
+
∫ r¯
rH(p,λ)
e˜∗w(w˜∗(p, λ)−, r∗i , λ)
−w˜∗p(p, λ)− dΓ0(ri) > 0.
Since θ˜∗(Γ0, p, λ) is increasing in J and u∗(Γ0, p, λ) is decreasing in θ, to prove the state-
ment of the proposition it suffices to prove that
∫ r¯
0 J(r
∗
i ) dΓ0(ri) is increasing in p. Using the
expressions derived in the proof of Lemma 2 it is possible to show that the derivative of∫ r¯
0 J(r
∗
i ) dΓ0(ri) with respect to p is (some functional arguments are omitted to ease notation)
d
dp
∫ r¯
0
J(r∗i ) dΓ0(ri) =∫ rL(p)
0
yp(p, e˜∗+) + ye e˜∗+w w˜∗+p +
ψ
1−ψ yp(p, e˜
∗
n)−
1
1−ψ w˜
∗+
p dΓ0(ri)
+
∫ rH(p,λ)
rL(p)
yp(p, e˜∗n)
1−ψ dΓ0(ri)
+
∫ r¯
rH(p,λ)
yp(p, e˜∗−) + ye e˜∗−w w˜∗−p +
ψ
1−ψ yp(p, e˜
∗
n)−
1
1−ψ w˜
∗−
p dΓ0(ri)
where the derivatives with respect to the limits cancel each other out since J is continuous in w.
Moreover, collecting w˜∗+p and w˜∗−p as common factors in the first and second line respectively,
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and rearranging, yields:
d
dp
∫ r¯
0
J(r∗i ) dΓ0(ri) =∫ rL(p)
0
yp(p, e˜∗+) +
ψ
1−ψ yp(p, e˜
∗
n) + w˜
∗+
p
1
1−ψ
{
[1−ψ]ye e˜∗+w − 1
}
dΓ0(ri)
+
∫ rH(p,λ)
rL(p)
yp(p, e˜∗n)
1−ψ dΓ0(ri)
+
∫ r¯
rH(p,λ)
yp(p, e˜∗−) +
ψ
1−ψ yp(p, e˜
∗
n) + w˜
∗−
p
1
1−ψ
{
[1−ψ]ye e˜∗−w − 1
}
dΓ0(ri) (51)
where the expressions in the curly brackets are the equivalent of the first-order conditions (50)
and (49), as expressed in (48), Proposition 1, for firms’ optimal wage setting policy characteris-
ing w˜∗(p)+ and w˜∗(p, λ)− respectively, and are therefore equal to zero. These deductions yield
the following:
d
dp
∫ r¯
0
J(r∗i ) dΓ0(ri) =
∫ rL(p)
0
yp(p, e˜∗+) +
ψ
1−ψ yp(p, e˜
∗
n) dΓ0(ri)
+
∫ rH(p,λ)
rL(p)
yp(p, e˜∗n)
1−ψ dΓ0(ri) +
∫ r¯
rH(p,λ)
yp(p, e˜∗−) +
ψ
1−ψ yp(p, e˜
∗
n) dΓ0(ri) > 0, (52)
which implies that
∫ r¯
0 J(r
∗
i ) dΓ0(ri) is increasing in p. 
Proof of Proposition 6. Using the results established in Proposition 2 it is straightforward
to show that
dW∗(Γ0, p, λ)
dλ
=
∫ r¯
rH(p,λ)
w˜λ(p, λ)− dΓ0(ri) > 0,
Moreover since R∗j (Γ0, p, λ) = W
∗(Γ0, p, λ) it can be deduced that R∗j (Γ0, p, λ) is also increasing
in λ. This, together with the results established in Theorem 1, enables to deduce that
dE∗i (Γ0, p, λ)
dλ
=
∫ r¯
rH(p,λ)
e˜∗w(w˜∗(p, λ)−, r∗i , λ)
−w˜∗λ(p, λ)
− + e˜∗λ(w˜
∗(p, λ)−, r∗i , λ)
− dΓ0(ri),
which is ambiguous since the first term is positive but the second term is negative due to e˜∗λ < 0
for all r∗i ∈ [rH , r¯].
Again, since θ˜∗(Γ0, p, λ) is increasing in J and u∗(Γ0, p, λ) is decreasing in θ, to prove the
statement of the proposition it suffices to prove that
∫ r¯
0 J(r
∗
i ) dΓ0(ri) is decreasing in λ. Using
the expressions derived in the proof of Lemma 2 it is possible to show that the derivative of
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∫ r¯
0 J(r
∗
i ) dΓ0(ri) with respect to λ is
d
dλ
∫ r¯
0
J(r∗i ) dΓ0(ri) =
∫ r¯
rH(p,λ)
ye e˜∗−λ + ye e˜
∗−
w w˜
∗−
λ −
1
1−ψ w˜
∗−
λ dΓ0(ri).
Collecting w˜∗−λ as the common factor and rearranging yields:
d
dλ
∫ r¯
0
J(r∗i ) dΓ0(ri) =
∫ r¯
rH(p,λ)
ye e˜∗−λ + w˜
∗−
λ
1
1−ψ
{
[1−ψ]ye e˜∗−w − 1
}
dΓ0(ri)
=
∫ r¯
rH(p,λ)
ye e˜∗−λ dΓ0(ri) < 0; (53)
since the term in curly brackets is equivalent to the first-order condition as expressed in (48),
Proposition 1, characterising w˜∗(p, λ)− and e˜∗λ < 0 for all r
∗
i ∈ [rH , r¯] as established by Theorem
1. Hence,
∫ r¯
0 J(r
∗
i ) dΓ0(ri) is decreasing in λ. 
Proof of Proposition 7. By the definition of first-order stochastic dominance, to prove the
statement of the proposition it suffices to show that W∗(Γ0, p, λ) is increasing in r∗i , and that
E∗i (Γ0, p, λ) and
∫ r¯
0 J(r
∗
i ) dΓ0(ri) are decreasing in r
∗
i . These results are readily established by
Proposition 2, Theorem 1 and Proposition 1 respectively. 
Proof of Proposition 8 . Using the expressions for the present discounted value of wages
and output, the job creation condition of the model can be re-written as
κ
h(θ˜∗)
− δ
[
Y
∗
(E∗)−W∗
]
= 0 (54)
Total (implicit) differentiation of (54) with respect to p yields
dθ˜∗
dp
= −
−δ
[
dY
∗
(E∗)
dp
− dW
∗
dp
]
−κh(θ˜∗)−2h′(θ˜∗)
which implies that the elasticity of θ˜∗ with respect to p is
εθ˜∗p =
dθ˜∗
dp
p
θ˜∗
=
δ
[
dY
∗
(E∗)
dp
− dW
∗
dp
]
−h′(θ˜∗) 1
h(θ˜∗)
κ
h(θ˜∗)
p
θ˜∗
. (55)
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Consider the denominator first. By appealing to the definition of the elasticity of the match-
ing function with respect to unemployment σ , and by substituting for κ/h(θ˜∗) using the job
creation condition given by (54), the denominator can be expressed as σδ
[
Y
∗
(E∗)−W∗
]
.
Next consider the numerator, and notice that the term in square brackets is equivalent to
d
dp
∫ r¯
0 J(r
∗
i ) dΓ0(ri) by definition. Hence,
[
dY
∗
(E∗)
dp
− dW
∗
dp
]
=
d
dp
∫ r¯
0
J(r∗i ) dΓ0(ri) =∫ rL(p)
0
yp(p, e˜∗+) +
ψ
1−ψ yp(p, e˜
∗
n) +
dw˜∗+
dp
1
1−ψ
{
[1−ψ]ye e˜∗+w − 1
}
dΓ0(ri)
+
∫ rH(p,λ)
rL(p)
yp(p, e˜∗n)
1−ψ −
dw˜∗=
dp
1
1−ψ dΓ0(ri)
+
∫ r¯
rH(p,λ)
yp(p, e˜∗−) +
ψ
1−ψ yp(p, e˜
∗
n) +
dw˜∗−
dp
1
1−ψ
{
[1−ψ]ye e˜∗−w − 1
}
dΓ0(ri)
as given in equation (51) and in which w˜∗= = r∗i . Moreover, by the definition of elasticity, sub-
stitute dw˜
∗
dp with εw˜∗p
w˜∗
p for all r
∗
i ∈ [0, r¯]. These manipulations lead to the following expression
[
dY
∗
(E∗)
dp
− dW
∗
dp
]
=
∫ rL(p)
0
yp(p, e˜∗+) +
ψ
1−ψ yp(p, e˜
∗
n) +εw˜∗+p
w˜∗+
p
1
(1−ψ) ·
{
[1−ψ]ye e˜∗+w − 1
}
dΓ0(ri)
+
∫ rH(p,λ)
rL(p)
yp(p, e˜∗n)
1−ψ −εw˜∗=p
w˜∗=
p
1
(1−ψ) dΓ0(ri)
+
∫ r¯
rH(p,λ)
yp(p, e˜∗−) +
ψ
1−ψ yp(p, e˜
∗
n) +εw˜∗−p
w˜∗−
p
1
(1−ψ) ·
{
[1−ψ]ye e˜∗−w − 1
}
dΓ0(ri).
Next, multiply
[
dY∗(E∗)
dp − dW
∗
dp
]
by δp, as required by expression for the numerator of the elas-
ticity of θ˜∗ with respect to p as derived above (equation (55)), and define
Λ(εw˜∗p , W
∗
) ≡ −
( ∫ rL(p)
0
εw˜∗+p
w˜∗+
1−ψ ·
{
[1−ψ]ye e˜∗+w − 1
}
dΓ0(ri)
−
∫ rH(p,λ)
rL(p)
εw˜∗=p
w˜∗=
1−ψ dΓ0(ri) +
∫ r¯
rH(p,λ)
εw˜∗−p
w˜∗−
1−ψ ·
{
[1−ψ]ye e˜∗−w − 1
}
dΓ0(ri)
)
. (56)
Finally, using the definitions of the expected present discounted value of output and wages
as defined in (24) and (25) respectively (recall that y is linear in p), the numerator takes the
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following form
δp
[
dY
∗
(E∗)
dp
− dW
∗
dp
]
= δ
[
Y
∗
(E∗)−Λ(εw˜∗p , W
∗
)
]
.
As such, by substituting the expressions for the numerator and denominator just derived into
(55) it yields
εθ˜∗p =
1
σ
Y
∗
(E∗)−Λ(εw˜∗p , W
∗
)
Y
∗
(E∗)−W∗ .

Proof of Proposition 9. First notice that since w˜∗= = r∗i , for all r
∗
i ∈ [rL, rH] the elasticity of
the wage with respect to p is zero, that is
∫ rH(p,λ)
rL(p)
εw˜∗=p dΓ0(ri) = 0. Then, using expression (56)
for Λ(εw˜∗p , W
∗
) as derived in the Proof of Proposition 8 above, notice that the terms in curly
brackets are equivalent to the first-order conditions characterising the optimal wage policy for
all r∗i ∈ [0, rL] and r∗i ∈ [rH , r¯], as expressed by (48), Proposition 1. Hence, they are equal to
zero and imply that Λ(εw˜∗p , W
∗
) = 0 independently of the magnitudes of εw˜∗+p and εw˜∗−p . 
Proof of Proposition 10. Following the logic of the two-step optimisation problem (30–31),
this proof is divided in two key parts. First, the optimal wage setting policy for incumbent
workers j will be characterised; then, the results obtained will be used to characterise the
optimal wage setting policy for new hires i.
Part 1.
Incumbent workers: preliminaries. Consider the functional equation corresponding to firms’
optimisation problem when employing incumbent workers j:
J(r j, q j) = max
w∈W
{
pi(r j, w, q j) +ψJ(w, q j)
}
.
Since this is analogous to the functional equation (7), the reader is referred to the preliminaries
of the Proof of Proposition 2 for technical details regarding existence and uniqueness of solu-
tions. Moreover, it has been established that J(r j, q j) is concave. This implies that the following
necessary first-order condition are also sufficient for the characterisation of a global maximum:
Υ(w; r j, p, q j, λ) ≡ ye(p, q j, e˜)e˜w(w, r j, λ)− 1 +ψye(p, q j, e˜′)e˜r(w′, w, λ) = 0.
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Moreover, Υ(w; r j, p, q j, λ) retains the same properties as the first order condition Υ(w; r, p, λ)
analysed in the Proof of Proposition 2. That is, Υw < 0,Υλ > 0 if w < r j and Υλ = 0 if w > r j.
Moreover, it is straightforward to show that Υq > 0.
Incumbent workers: productivity thresholds. In contrast to the reference wage thresholds de-
fined in the Proof of Proposition 2, it is useful here to characterise firms’ optimal wage setting
policy with respect to productivity thresholds on the distribution of match productivity q j.
As such, the threshold ql(r j, λ) identifies the critical match productivity below which a firm
would want to set the wage below the reference wage, and qu(r j) is the match productivity
above which a firm would want to compensate the worker more than the reference wage. The
former is the value of q j below which the value function is decreasing just below the reference
wage; the latter is the value of q j above which the value function is increasing just above the
reference wage:
qu(r j) ≡ {q j : lim
→0
Υ(r j +; r j, p, q j, λ) = 0};
ql(r j, λ) ≡ {q j : lim
→0
Υ(r j −; r j, p, q j, λ) = 0}.
Using the results derived in the Proof of Proposition 2 it can be established that qu(r j) >
ql(r j, λ) and that if λ = 1 then qu(r j) > ql(r j, 1).
Incumbent workers: optimal wage setting policy. The optimal wage setting policy characteris-
ing the wage of incumbent workers depends on the level of match productivity q j in relation
to the thresholds derived above.
If q j < ql(r j, λ), the definition of ql and the concavity of the value function, along with
the fact that Υq > 0, can be used to deduce that the optimal wage must satisfy w < r j, and
therefore it will be the solution to
ye(p, q j, e˜)e˜w(w, r j, λ)− − 1 +ψye(p, q j, e˜′)e˜r(w′, w, λ)− = 0,
which is denoted by w˜(p, q j, λ)−.
If q j > qu(r j), the definition of qu and the concavity of the value function, along with the
fact thatΥq > 0, can be used to deduce that the optimal wage must satisfy w > r j, and therefore
it will be the solution to
ye(p, q j, e˜)e˜w(w, r j)+ − 1 +ψye(p, q j, e˜′)e˜r(w′, w)+ = 0,
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which is denoted by w˜(p, q j)+.
Finally, if q j ∈ [ql , qu] by the same arguments above it is possible to deduce that Υ < 0 for
all w > r j and that Υ > 0 for all w < r j. Hence J(r j, q j) is maximised if and only if the optimal
wage policy is w = r j.
Incumbent workers: expected continuation value. It is now possible to use these results to write
analytical expressions for the expected continuation value of an employment relationship with
an incumbent worker, for any realisation of q j. By using notation consistent with the rest of the
analysis, these can be expressed as follows:
J(r j, q j)+ = y(p, q j, e˜(w˜(p, q j)+, r j)+) +
ψ
1−ψ y(p, q j, e˜n)−
w˜(p, q j)+
1−ψ ;
J(r j, q j)= =
y(p, q j, e˜n)− r j
1−ψ ;
J(r j, q j)− = y(p, q j, e˜(w˜(p, q j, λ)−, r j, λ)−) +
ψ
1−ψ y(p, q j, e˜n)−
w˜(p, q j, λ)−
1−ψ .
As such, the expected continuation value of an employment relationship with an incumbent
worker can be written more compactly as:
∫
J(r j, q j)Q(qi, dq j) =
∫ ql(r j ,λ)
J(r j, q j)− Q(qi, dq j)
+
∫ qu(r j)
ql(r j ,λ)
J(r j, q j)= Q(qi, dq j) +
∫
qu(r j)
J(r j, q j)+ Q(qi, dq j). (57)
Part 2.
Newly hired workers: preliminaries. The functional equation corresponding to firms’ optimi-
sation problem when employing newly hired workers i is
J(ri, qi) = max
w∈W
{
pi(ri, w, qi) +ψ
∫
J(w, q j)Q(qi, dq j)
}
,
where
∫
J(w, q)Q(qi, dq j) is the expected continuation value of the employment relationship as
expressed in (57), when new hires become incumbents. As such, there exists a unique solution
to this functional equation and at least one optimal wage policy exists.
The first order necessary condition to characterise an optimum is
Υ(w; ri, p, qi, λ) ≡ ye(p, qi, e˜)e˜w(w, ri, λ)− 1 +ψ
∫
Jr(w, q j)Q(qi, dq j) = 0;
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in which, since the value function J(w, q j) is continuous in all its arguments, the partial deriva-
tives with respect to the limits of integration in
∫
Jr(w, q j)Q(qi, dq j) cancel out.
The related envelope condition, for any possible realisation of q j, can be analytically ob-
tained from (57):
Jr(r j, q j)+ = ye(p, q j, e˜)e˜r(w˜(p, q j)+, r j)+ if q j > qu(r j);
Jr(r j, q j)= = − 11−ψ if q j ∈ [ql , qu];
Jr(r j, q j)− = ye(p, q j, e˜)e˜r(w˜(p, q j, λ)−, r j, λ)− if q j < ql(r j, λ).
To ease the notational burden, denote the optimal wage paid to incumbent workers w˜(p, q j)+
and w˜(p, q j, λ)− as w˜+j and w˜
−
j respectively; and the transition function Q(qi, dq j) as dQ. Com-
bining the envelope conditions with the first order condition yields:
Υ(w; ri, p, qi, λ) ≡
ye(p, qi, e˜)e˜w(w, ri, λ)− 1 +ψ
∫ ql(w,λ)
ye(p, q j, e˜)e˜r(w˜−j , w, λ)
− dQ
−ψ
∫ qu(w)
ql(w,λ)
1
1−ψ dQ +ψ
∫
qu(w)
ye(p, q j, e˜)e˜r(w˜+j , w)
+ dQ = 0; (58)
which is the necessary condition for the characterisation of the optimal wage of newly hired
workers. For this condition to be also sufficient, it is left to be shown that the value function
J(ri, qi) is concave, which is equivalent to show that Υw(w; ri, p, qi, λ) < 0.
First notice that by appealing to the results established in the Proof of Theorem 1 and in
Lemma 4, it is possible to show that e˜r(·, r j)+ = −e˜w(w, ·)+ and that e˜r(·, r j, λ)− = −λe˜w(w, ·)+
since due to adaptation r j = w (recall that e˜r is independent of its first argument and e˜w is
independent of its second argument). As such, we can re-write (58) as follows
ye(p, qi, e˜)e˜w − 1− λe˜+wψ
∫ ql(w,λ)
ye(p, q j, e˜) dQ
− ψ
1−ψ
∫ qu(w)
ql(w,λ)
dQ− e˜+wψ
∫
qu(w)
ye(p, q j, e˜) dQ = 0.
By collecting e˜+w as the common factor, and after some algebra, this expression can be re-
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arranged in the following useful way:
ye(p, qi, e˜)
e˜w
e˜+w
+
1
e˜+w
[
1 +
ψ
1−ψ
∫ qu(w)
ql(w,λ)
dQ
]
=
= ψ
[
λ
∫ ql(w,λ)
ye(p, q j, e˜) dQ +
∫
qu(w)
ye(p, q j, e˜) dQ
]
. (59)
Next, the derivative of the first-order condition Υ(w; ri, p, qi, λ) with respect to w is
ye(p, qi, e˜)e˜ww − e˜+wwλψ
∫
ql(w,λ)
ye(p, q j, e˜) dQ− e˜+wwψ
∫
qu(w)
ye(p, q j, e˜) dQ
where again the derivative with respect to the limits cancel each other out (by the first-order
condition characterising w˜ j). Then, after collecting e˜+ww as the common factor and using the ex-
pression derived in (59) to substitute for the term in square brackets, and then again collecting
ye(p, qi, e˜) as the common factor, this can be written as
ye(p, qi, e˜)
[
e˜ww − e˜w e˜
+
ww
e˜+w
]
+
e˜+ww
e˜+w
[
1 +
ψ
1−ψ
∫ qu(w)
ql(w,λ)
dQ
]
.
Now, notice that if e˜ = e˜+ in the first employment period, it implies that e˜w = e˜+w and that
e˜ww = e˜+ww; if e˜ = e˜−, it implies that e˜w = λe˜+w and that e˜ww = λe˜+ww; and if e˜ = e˜n then e˜w = 0
and e˜ww = 0. These considerations enable to deduce that the first term in the expression above
is zero, and therefore that
Υw(w; ri, p, qi, λ) =
e˜+ww
e˜+w
[
1 +
ψ
1−ψ
∫ qu(w)
ql(w,λ)
dQ
]
< 0;
since e˜+w > 0 and e˜+ww < 0. This establishes concavity of the value function J(ri, qi) and con-
firms that the first-order condition (58) is also sufficient for the identification of the unique
maximum.
Newly hired workers: productivity threshold and optimal wage setting. The productivity thresh-
olds characterising the optimal wage setting policy of firms employing newly hired workers
can be defined analogously to those characterising the optimal wage of incumbents. However,
note that since ri = 0 by assumption U2, it is straightforward to verify that lim→0 Υ(ri ±
, ri, p, qi, λ) = 0 for any given initial qi, implying that qu(0) = ql(0, λ) = 0.
As such, firms employing newly hired workers would always want to pay them a wage
above their reference wage, and the optimal wage must satisfy the first-order condition (58)
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for w > ri, and it is therefore denoted by w˜(p, qi, λ)+ > ri. 
Proof of Proposition 11. This proof follows the same steps and logic of the Proof of Propo-
sition 8. Total(implicit) differentiation of the job creation condition
κ
h(θ˜∗(λ))
− δ
[
Y
∗
(λ)−W∗(λ)
]
= 0
with respect to p yields
dθ˜∗
dp
= −
−δ
[
dY
∗
(λ)
dp
− dW
∗
(λ)
dp
]
−κh(θ˜∗)−2h′(θ˜∗) ;
which implies that the elasticity of θ˜∗(λ) with respect to p is
εθ˜∗p =
dθ˜∗
dp
p
θ˜∗
=
δ
[
dY
∗
(λ)
dp
− dW
∗
(λ)
dp
]
−h′(θ˜∗) 1
h(θ˜∗)
κ
h(θ˜∗)
p
θ˜∗
. (60)
By appealing to the definition of the elasticity of the matching function with respect to un-
employment σ , and by substituting for κ/h(θ˜∗(λ)) using the job creation condition above, the
denominator can be expressed as σδ
[
Y
∗
(λ)−W∗(λ)
]
. Next consider the numerator
δp
[
dY
∗
(λ)
dp
− dW
∗
(λ)
dp
]
,
and in particular the two terms in square brackets. From the definitions of Y
∗
(λ) and W∗(λ)
as given by (37) and (36) respectively (functional arguments are omitted and notation will be
slightly abused to reduce the notational burden):
dY
∗
(λ)
dp
= yi,p + yi,e e˜∗+i,ww˜
∗+
i,p +ψ
∫ ql
y j,p + y j,e e˜∗−j,ww˜
∗−
j,p + y j,e e˜
∗−
j,r w˜
∗+
i,p +
ψ
1−ψ y j,p dQ
+ψ
∫ qu
ql
1
1−ψ y j,p dQ
+ψ
∫
qu
y j,p + y j,e e˜∗+j,ww˜
∗+
j,p + y j,e e˜
∗+
j,r w˜
∗+
i,p +
ψ
1−ψ y j,p dQ;
dW∗(λ)
dp
= w˜∗+i,p +
ψ
1−ψ
∫ ql
w˜∗−j,p dQ +
ψ
1−ψ
∫ qu
ql
w˜∗+i,p dQ +
ψ
1−ψ
∫
qu
w˜∗+j,p dQ.
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Notice that in both expressions the derivatives with respect to the limits cancel each other out,
by the continuity of Y
∗
(λ) and W∗(λ) with respect to q. Combining these two expressions
together as in the numerator, and collecting the terms ψ1−ψ w˜
∗−
j,p ,
ψ
1−ψ w˜
∗+
j,p and w˜
∗+
i,p as common
factors yields:
dY
∗
(λ)
dp
− dW
∗
(λ)
dp
= yi,p +
∫
y j,p +
ψ
1−ψ y j,p dQ
w˜∗+i,p
[
yi,e e˜∗+i,w − 1 +ψ
∫ ql
y j,e e˜∗−j,r dQ−ψ
∫ qu
ql
1
1−ψ dQ +ψ
∫
qu
y j,e e˜∗+j,r dQ
]
+
ψ
1−ψ w˜
∗−
j,p
∫ ql {
[1−ψ]y j,e e˜∗−j,w − 1
}
dQ +
ψ
1−ψ w˜
∗+
j,p
∫
qu
{
[1−ψ]y j,e e˜∗+j,w − 1
}
dQ.
It can now be noticed that the expression in square brackets in the second line is equivalent
to the first-order condition characterising the optimal wage paid to new hires i, as given by
(58), as established in the proof of Proposition 10; while the expressions in curly brackets in
the third line are equivalent to the first-order conditions characterising the wage of incumbent
workers as established in the proof of Proposition 10. As such, both the second and third line
are equal to zero and the numerator in (60) is:
δp
[
dY
∗
(λ)
dp
− dW
∗
(λ)
dp
]
= δp
[
yi,p +
∫
y j,p +
ψ
1−ψ yp dQ
]
= δY
∗
(λ)
due to the linearity of y with respect to p. Hence, the elasticity expression (60) collapses to
εθ˜∗p =
1
σ
Y
∗
(λ)
Y
∗
(λ)−W∗(λ) .

Proof of Proposition 12. Consider the steady-state wage paid to newly hired workers
w˜(p, qi, λ)+ > ri. Using the results established in the Proof of Proposition 10, implicit (partial)
differentiation with respect to λ yields:
w˜∗λ(p, qi, λ)
+ = −Υλ(w; ri, p, qi, λ)
Υw(w; ri, p, qi, λ)
=
(e˜+w )
2ψ
∫ ql(w,λ)
ye dQ
e˜+ww
[
1 +
ψ
1−ψ
∫ qu(w)
ql(w,λ)
dQ
] < 0,
since e˜+ww < 0 due to the concavity of the optimal effort function onW .
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Next consider the steady-state wage paid to incumbent workers W∗(r∗j , p, Q, λ). For any
given r∗j , using the results established in the Proof of Proposition 2, it is straightforward to
conclude that
W∗λ (r
∗
j , p, Q, λ) =
∫ ql(w,λ)
w˜∗λ(p, q j, λ)
− dQ > 0.

Proof of Proposition 13. Total derivative of the elasticity of labour market tightness (38)
with respect to λ yields
dεθ˜∗p
dλ
=
1
σ
1[
1−
[
W∗(λ)/Y∗(λ)
]]2 [
Y
∗
(λ)
]2 ·
[
dW∗(λ)
dλ
Y
∗
(λ)− dY
∗
(λ)
dλ
W∗(λ)
]
.
The sign of this expression crucially depends on the sign of the second term in square brackets.
From the results established in the Proof of Proposition 12 and from the expressions character-
ising the expected present values of wages and output, as given by (36) and (37) respectively,
it is possible to establish that
dW∗(λ)
dλ
= w˜∗+i,λ +
ψ
1−ψ
[∫ ql(w,λ)
w˜∗−j,λ − dQ +
∫ qu(w)
ql(w,λ)
w˜∗+i,λ dQ
]
= w˜∗+i,λ
[
1− ψ
1−ψ
∫ qu(w)
ql(w,λ)
dQ
]
+
ψ
1−ψ
∫ ql(w,λ)
w˜∗−j,λ dQ,
where the second line follows from collecting w˜∗+i,λ as the common factor; and that
dY
∗
(λ)
dλ
= yi,e e˜∗+i,ww˜
∗+
i,λ +ψ
∫ ql
y j,e e˜∗+j,ww˜
∗−
j,λ + y j,e e˜
∗−
j,r w˜
∗+
i,λ + y j,e e˜
∗−
j,λ dQ +ψ
∫
qu
y j,e e˜∗+j,r w˜
∗+
i,λ dQ
= e˜∗+i,ww˜
∗+
i,λ
{
yi,e −ψ
[
λ
∫ ql
y j,e dQ +
∫
qu
y j,e dQ
]}
+ψ
∫ ql
y j,e e˜∗+j,ww˜
∗−
j,λ + y j,e e˜
∗−
j,λ dQ
= w˜∗+i,λ
[
1− ψ
1−ψ
∫ qu(w)
ql(w,λ)
dQ
]
+ψ
∫ ql
y j,e e˜∗+j,ww˜
∗−
j,λ dQ +ψ
∫ ql
y j,e e˜∗−j,λ dQ,
where the second line follows from the fact that e˜−r = −λe˜+w , after collecting e˜∗+i,ww˜∗+i,λ as the
common factor, and the third line uses an algebraic manipulation of equation (59).
By combining these two expressions as required by the term in square brackets and col-
lecting w˜∗+i,λ
[
1− ψ1−ψ
∫ qu(w)
ql(w,λ)
dQ
]
and ψ1−ψ
∫ ql(w,λ) w˜∗−j,λ dQ as common factors yields expression
(39) in the body of the paper. The statement of the proposition is then readily verified given
the results established by Proposition 12. 
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